

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOI/PA
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FOI/PA# 1211520-0

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~~PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL~~
BY SPECIAL MESSENGER

Handwritten: *Mr. [illegible]*
Stamp: **UCL**
Stamp: **SEP 11 1946 P**
Stamp: **1946**

September 10, 1946

~~PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL~~

Honorable Adolf A. Berle, Jr.
70 Pine Street
New York, New York

Dear Mr. Berle:

In view of the desire of the Central Intelligence Group, headed by General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, to take over all intelligence coverage in Latin America, the Federal Bureau of Investigation is preparing to withdraw from this field and to turn over responsibility to the Central Intelligence Group.

In view of your interest in this work, I want to take this occasion to express my sincere appreciation for your splendid cooperation during the years that the Federal Bureau of Investigation operated in the Latin American intelligence field. Your assistance contributed materially to the success of our operations during the difficult war years. I am indeed appreciative of the personal interest displayed by you in the difficult problem of intelligence coverage faced by the Federal Bureau of Investigation when it took over such work in 1940.

With best wishes and kind regards,

Sincerely yours,

Director

VPK:mjj

RECORDED

EX-25

SEP 13 1946

SEP 11 1946 P.M.

SEP 24 1946

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

- Mr. Tolson
- Mr. E. A. Tamm
- Mr. Clegg
- Mr. Glavin
- Mr. Ladd
- Mr. Nichols
- Mr. Rosen
- Mr. Tracy
- Mr. Carson
- Mr. Egan
- Mr. Gurnea
- Mr. Harbo
- Mr. Hendon
- Mr. Pennington
- Mr. Quinn Tamm
- Mr. Nease
- Miss Gandy

September 10, 1946

PERSONAL AND ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
BY SPECIAL MESSENGER

Honorable James V. Forrestal
Secretary of the Navy
Washington, D. C.

Dear Jim:

In view of the desire of the Central Intelligence Group headed by General Hoyt S. Vandenberg to take over all intelligence coverage in Latin America, the Federal Bureau of Investigation of course is preparing to withdraw its personnel from this field and turn over responsibility to the Central Intelligence Group.

I want to take this occasion to express my sincere appreciation for your splendid cooperation during the years that the Federal Bureau of Investigation operated in the Latin American intelligence field. Your assistance contributed materially to the success of our operations during the difficult war years. I am indeed appreciative of the personal interest displayed by you in the difficult problem of intelligence coverage faced by the Federal Bureau of Investigation when it took over such work in 1940. I hope that the Federal Bureau of Investigation may continue to be of assistance to you in connection with our mutual problems.

With best wishes and kind regards,

Sincerely yours,

VPK:MMG

RECORDED
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE
SEP 11 1946

SEP 13 1946

SEP 11 1946

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

SEP 24 1946

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E.A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Carson
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Mr. Nease
Miss Gandy

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: September 11, 1946

FROM : D. M. Ladd

Time of Call: 4:40 PM
9-11-46

SUBJECT:

Mr. Tolson	
Mr. E.A. Tamm	
Mr. Clegg	
Mr. Glavin	
Mr. Ladd	
Mr. Nichols	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Tracy	
Mr. Carson	
Mr. Egan	
Mr. Gurnea	
Mr. Harbo	
Mr. Hendon	
Mr. Pennington	
Mr. Quinn Tamm	
Tele. Room	
Mr. Nease	
Miss Gandy	

In accordance with your instructions, I finally was able to telephonically reach [] at which time I advised him that in connection with the request of General Vandenberg for an appointment with the Director that you had returned to the city earlier than you had expected and that in the event General Vandenberg desired to come over this afternoon, you would be very glad to see him. [] stated that General Vandenberg was at that time tied up in a CIG conference and, therefore, would be unable to come over this afternoon. He requested, however, that if at all possible an appointment be made for General Vandenberg with you for tomorrow afternoon, Thursday, September 12, 1946. I advised [] that I did not know what your commitments were or whether you would be in the city on Thursday but that I would check for him and let him know if it was possible for you to see General Vandenberg Thursday afternoon.

b3

DML:da

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162-80750-175

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DATE 4/4/91 BY SP2/AM/mj

59 SEP 25 1946

Central Intelligence Group

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

FROM : D. M. Ladd

SUBJECT:

DATE: September 12, 1946

Time of Call: 10:45 AM

9-12-46

Mr. Tolson	
Mr. E. A. Tamm	
Mr. Clegg	
Mr. Glavin	
Mr. Ladd	
Mr. Nichols	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Tracy	
Mr. Carson	
Mr. Egan	
Mr. Gurnea	
Mr. Harbo	
Mr. Hendon	
Mr. Pennington	
Mr. Quinn Tamm	
Tele. Room	
Mr. Nease	
Miss Beahm	
Miss Gandy	

The appointment of General Vandenberg with you scheduled for 3:30 PM, September 12, 1946, was confirmed through [redacted] office.

DML:da

RECORDED

162-80750-176

37 SEP 17 1946

59 SEP 25 1946

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DATE 4.4.97 BY SP4 ALM/ma

Central Intelligence Group

392

FROM

OFFICE OF DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

TO

OFFICIAL INDICATED BELOW BY CHECK MARK

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Carson

Director's Notation: "I would like to have Ladd show this to Fred Lyons at once & have Lyons show it to Braden as it refers to matter Braden called about yesterday. It is useless & wasteful for us to keep a man in Panama as liason & we wont do it. The Army characteristically will never yield an inch of jurisdiction once they get it. H."

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DATE 4/4/97 BY SP2/AM/MLL

ENCLOSURE

62-80750-178

SECRET - AIR COURIER

Date: August 13, 1946

To: Attache
Paris, France

From: Director, FBI

Subject: Office of the FBI Attache
Paris, France

DECLASSIFIED BY *SP-1/KAL/m*
ON *4/14/93*

The Central Intelligence Group, which operates under the direction of the National Intelligence Authority set up by Presidential Directive in January, 1946, expects to operate a world-wide foreign intelligence field operational force. In view of the desires of the Central Intelligence Group to take over all foreign intelligence, the Bureau is making plans to withdraw in the near future from Latin American and will thereafter have no further responsibility with reference to it.

There will be continued, however, certain posts in foreign countries strictly as police liaison posts. It is expected that the offices in London, Paris, and Madrid will be continued on this basis.

Your principal responsibility, of course, in continuing your office as a police liaison post after the discontinuance of the Bureau's SIS program will be to obtain information which will be of assistance to the Bureau in connection with its domestic field responsibilities. It should, of course, be realized that a wide variety of information will be of assistance in this regard; for instance, any matters bearing on world communism would be of definite assistance in connection with the Bureau's investigation of subversive activities in the United States. Any such information will be obtained by you, of course, as it has in the past, in a strictly liaison capacity. In this connection, you should make every endeavor to extend your liaison contracts, particularly with various government agencies and police organizations. It is believed that a great deal more information can be obtained through development of police contacts than has been done throughout the war period. You should endeavor to develop this source in all matters relating to the Bureau's domestic responsibilities.

The continuing of your office on the police liaison basis will not be concerned with the responsibility of obtaining foreign intelligence and will, therefore, be no concern of the Central Intelligence Group. It will be a matter which will concern the Bureau and of course, the State Department. You should not discuss this matter with anyone in the Embassy as appropriate arrangements will be made by the Bureau with the State Department in Washington. You should, however, advise the Bureau promptly of any queries you receive in this regard and should defer answering such queries until communicating with the Bureau.

Legal Attache
London, England

CC: Legal Attache
Madrid, Spain

EX-53

7 SEP 17 1946

57 SEP 30 1946

ON ORIGINAL

RECORDED

C. H. Carson

August 22, 1946

Joseph E. Presley

Closing of San Jose, Costa Rica, Office

Inspector Myron E. Gurnea arrived in San Jose, Costa Rica, on August 11, 1946, to assist the writer in closing the office and turning over the physical property to the representative of CIG who arrived in San Jose on August 16th.

All investigative files, both pending and closed, were burned, as well as all indices. The administrative files of the office were examined by Mr. Gurnea and those of which the Bureau had a copy were burned and the remainder forwarded to the Bureau by diplomatic pouch. All official contacts and confidential informants of the San Jose Office were notified that the Legal Attache's Office was closing and all paid confidential informants were paid up to date. The automobile, Bureau manuals, code books, guns, camera and radio crystals were sent to the Bureau. All other property, including office furniture, radio equipment, darkroom equipment, photostat machine, etc. was turned over to [redacted] CIG representative, on August 16th in accordance with Bureau instructions and a memorandum receipt was obtained. Copies of this memorandum receipt were furnished the Bureau and a copy was given to the Charge d'Affaires of the Embassy.

No files or indices were given to [redacted] and he was advised that inasmuch as the Embassy had received a list of all pending cases in the Legal Attache Office, all information concerning these cases could be obtained from the Embassy.

In discussions with [redacted] and Mr. Raleigh Gibson, Charge d'Affaires of the Embassy, it was agreed that all matters of policy would be strictly between [redacted] and the Embassy.

b3

Inasmuch as the CIG representative made no mention of sources of information, contacts or confidential informants of the Legal Attache's Office, none of these were turned over to him.

7 SEP 17 1946

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Carson
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn
Mr. Nease
Miss Gandy

27 1946

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DATE 4-17-97 BY SP2/ALG/MS

The Charge d'Affaires was advised of the manner of turning over the office to [redacted] and this was obviously agreeable to both the Embassy and [redacted] and no clashes or disagreements occurred. On the contrary, [redacted] expressed to Mr. Gurnea and the writer his appreciation for the helpful cooperative way in which he had been received and in which the entire matter had been handled.

b3

JEP:RO

THE DIRECTOR

August 22, 1946

C. H. Carson

INTERVIEW WITH WILLIAM D. PAWLEY, UNITED STATES
AMBASSADOR TO BRAZIL

Pursuant to your instructions, I talked with the Ambassadors, or in their absence, to the Charge d'Affaires, in each of the Latin American countries visited by me. They were all without exception vociferous in their praise of the Bureau's operations there and extremely loud in their objections to any change whatsoever in the present setup whereby the FBI maintains intelligence coverage in Latin America. Without exception they voiced strong objections to the entire CIC idea and indicated that they have protested and will continue to protest this program. I am preparing memoranda summarizing the results of my interviews in the above regard. It can be stated that while a number of the Ambassadors protested strongly the Bureau's recall of the Legal Attache and some other important key Agent within their country, no Ambassador undertook to be critical of the Bureau's position in this regard with the exception of Ambassador Pawley in Brazil. The interview with Mr. Pawley is being covered first although I interviewed him last for the reason that this interview is believed most important and significant in view of the stand being taken by Mr. Pawley and his probable future importance in connection with Latin American affairs.

It will be recalled that Mr. Pawley is being currently rumored as the probable successor to Mr. Spruille Braden as Assistant Secretary of State in charge of the American Republics Division. It will be further recalled that he has been a staunch supporter of the Bureau in the past and he is probably the most vociferous advocate at this time of the Bureau continuing in Latin America. Mr. Pawley is the only Ambassador interviewed by me who has had an opportunity to talk with General Vandenberg personally and he talked with General Vandenberg together with General Eisenhower at some length during the week preceding my interview with him.

Mr. Pawley, it will be recalled, is an extremely wealthy businessman and comparatively new to Government service and Ambassadorial work. He is reputed to be a personal friend of President Truman as well as United States Attorney General Tom Clark and Democratic Chairman Bob Hannigan. He is extremely active, vigorous, and aggressive, and is obviously very ambitious with regard to his future position in the United States Government.

Prior to my arrival in Brazil, the Bureau had ordered the recall of former Legal Attache Charles McNabb; Assistant Legal Attache George Van Noy, assigned in Rio de Janeiro; Police Liaison Agent James L. Byrd, assigned in Porto Alegre; and Police Liaison Agent R. W. Allen, assigned in Sao Paulo, Brazil. Mr. Pawley was obviously perturbed and upset at the initiation of the interview because of the Bureau's recall of these men and he had obviously discussed this recall in detail with General Vandenberg inasmuch as he undertook to quote General Vandenberg directly in connection therewith. Ambassador Pawley started out as stating that he wanted it definitely understood by me that he had been, was now, and would continue to be in favor of the

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DATE 4-7-97 BY SP2/AM/mw

FBI continuing in Latin America as in the past; that he has taken this position in the past and will continue to so advocate until he is personally advised by President Truman that the latter desires and prefers some new setup such as the CIG program. He stated that he plans to visit Washington in the near future and that he intends to discuss the matter personally with President Truman. He stated that he "jumped all over" General Vandenberg upon the occasion of the latter's recent visit to Brazil, telling the General that he was violently and unalterably opposed to any change in the present setup in Latin America inasmuch as he definitely did not think that the General could create an organization in Latin America to compare with the Bureau's setup from the standpoint of efficiency, etc., to the best interests of the United States Government. He stated that General Vandenberg seemed somewhat embarrassed and stated, "You are very frank in advising me of your efforts to talk me out of a job." Pawley stated that he replied he had nothing against Vandenberg or anyone else connected with the new program personally, but that he was talking as a responsible Ambassador and as a patriotic American citizen. He stated that he told Vandenberg that he, Pawley, will not accept such decision as may have been reached in this matter as final until he has personally talked to the President and has been assured by the President that a change is desired by the President and is in the opinion of the latter necessary. He stated that General Vandenberg indicated to him that the new setup was in accordance with the desires of the President but that he, Pawley, prefers to hear this personally from the President's lips. He, thereafter, voiced strong criticism concerning the Bureau's withdrawal of its personnel from Brazil and became so agitated that he shouted loud enough to be overheard by his Secretary outside who laughed and remarked to me as I left the room that the interview must have been an extremely interesting one from the sound of the Ambassador's voice.

I explained to Mr. Pawley that the decision to withdraw from Latin America was not of the Bureau's making, although the Director had not sought this work for the Bureau in the beginning nor was the Bureau seeking it now, pointing out that the decision to set up CIG as a successor to the FBI in taking over the work in Latin America had been approved by the NIA and the President apparently as a result of the recommendation of General Vandenberg, after the latter was appointed as Director of CIG to succeed Admiral Souers. The Bureau had been advised specifically by General Vandenberg in response to its inquiry that the General did desire to supplant the FBI in Latin America with his own CIG organization. I explained that despite the fact that General Vandenberg obviously desired to set up and operate his own organization, presumably with the belief that it would be more efficient, etc. and despite the obvious difficulties and complete incongruity of any future FBI operations, that in view of such a situation, you have agreed to cooperate and that you are sincere in attempting to cooperate with General Vandenberg and the other interested Government officials in working out a program of smooth and harmonious changeover from our setup to the CIG setup. I explained to him that at the time of my departure from Washington negotiations were being carried on with CIG in an effort to work out the details of the closing of our offices and the carrying on of the work by CIG so that there will be no resulting gap in intelligence coverage. I explained to the Ambassador that further operation on the part of our offices cannot possibly be as efficient, inasmuch as the Bureau would be completely unable to make the necessary plans and commitments for the future which must be foreseen and constantly carried

forward if proper efficiency, etc., are to be maintained. I explained to him that the Bureau has always found it necessary to make transfers and changes as to personnel in various countries and on various assignments, and that these changes and transfers have been necessary in the past and would continue to be in the future whether we continued in SIS work or not. I explained to him that the Bureau had been planning for some time prior to the decision concerning CIG's taking over and supplanting us a postwar retrenchment program, in order to curtail expenses and operate on an efficient basis with a minimum expenditure of personnel and money, and that you, as the Director of the FBI, had insisted prior to the actual end of the war that these plans be made for the entire FBI. I told the Ambassador that I knew this had been your position, and was still your position, and that it was my understanding that President Truman, as well as the Congress, felt the same way.

The Ambassador was strongly inclined to argue the point of any retrenchment being necessary or even advisable in Brazil. While he did not so state, he had obviously been propagandized by General Vandenberg to the effect that the Bureau was withdrawing its personnel in an effort to embarrass the General and his proposed CIG program. Mr. Pawley stated, "That General Vandenberg told me he does not desire that a single FBI man be withdrawn from Latin America at the present time." He continued that he personally participated in obtaining an appropriation to cover FBI operations in Latin America until the end of the current fiscal year, for which reason he could not understand the withdrawal of three of our most important and, in his opinion, indispensable agents from Brazil during what he termed a current crisis in connection with Communist activities, etc., in Brazil.

I explained to the Ambassador that what General Vandenberg might think concerning the withdrawal had no real bearing on the matter inasmuch as the Bureau as long as it continued to carry on the work would insist upon following its own judgment and making its own decisions both as to the amount and identity of the personnel utilized. In view of his insistence and obvious desire to argue the point with some heat, I pointed out to him courteously, but bluntly, that while he had been in Brazil as Ambassador for approximately seven weeks the Bureau had been operating intelligence coverage in the country since 1940, and that the Bureau would insist upon the right of judging for itself the actual needs as to the amount and identity of personnel utilized in maintaining adequate coverage.

With regard to his statement that he could not agree concerning the necessity or desirability of any retrenchment at the present time in Brazil or Peru (a country in which he previously served), I pointed out to him that you felt a very strong duty to the President and to the Government generally, as well as to the American taxpayer, of operating with a minimum of personnel and money consistent with the maintenance of adequate and efficient coverage. I pointed out to him that the Bureau had been convinced prior to the receipt of any appropriation for foreign operation during the current fiscal year that we could safely retrench and still maintain adequate coverage; that for this reason the Bureau had only asked for the same amount of money as during the preceding year despite the fact that the actual operating costs, including expenses, etc. of each Agent and other needed personnel had, as foreseen by the Bureau, greatly increased in view of the inflationary prices throughout Latin American countries. The Ambassador immediately stated that he

agreed with the Director's position and indicated that he had not realized that such a retrenchment program had been considered possible and had been contemplated by the Bureau prior to the CIG decision. He stated that he particularly desired that I not misinterpret his criticism and approach to the problem, that he would certainly not want you and the Bureau to think that he is in any way antagonistic or hostile, that what he was trying to do was to express vigorously and to the utmost of his ability his conviction that FBI personnel with their training, background, experience, and ability are desperately needed in Brazil at the present time. I pointed out to him that he still has FBI personnel sufficient to maintain adequate coverage in Brazil, and that the decision to dispense with this personnel and substitute the CIG organization was not your decision but that naturally you are perfectly willing to comply with the decision as made.

Pawley stated that in view of the above he would not attempt to argue further the matter of current FBI withdrawal and transfers, although he does think that FBI personnel should be utilized in assisting to set up the CIG program, provided it has to be set up (he continued to reiterate that he will refuse to accept the decision whereby CIG supplants FBI in Latin America until he is personally assured by the President that such must be). I explained to the Ambassador that you, as Director of the FBI, had responsibilities concerning intelligence and other matters at home within the United States, which I thought any reasonable person should admit are even more pressing and vital insofar as United States interests might be concerned than the matter of intelligence coverage in any particular foreign country. Further, that it was not felt that FBI personnel could be spared either by way of lending or permanent transfer to CIG or any other governmental agency, inasmuch as this personnel was urgently needed in the FBI's domestic work. I also pointed out to him in this connection that General Vandenberg and the NIA very obviously did not agree as to the indispensability of FBI personnel in view of the decision to set up CIG to supplant the FBI.

The Ambassador stated that in his opinion the above described decision was completely and totally wrong but that if the President actually had ordered a change, then he, the Ambassador, was primarily concerned with seeing the changed setup work. He stated that he definitely does not believe that the CIG setup would have any chance whatsoever of succeeding without the assistance of some FBI personnel. He stated that his suggestion would be that the FBI people continue to operate in complete charge of the various offices with direct and primary responsibility to you as Director of the FBI, but that CIG personnel be permitted to work in the offices under the jurisdiction and direction of FBI personnel and the FBI until the CIG personnel can acquire the necessary experience, training, etc. He stated that this should continue, in his opinion, not only until the end of the current fiscal year, but for some time to come and that in his opinion funds should be made available to the FBI in connection therewith.

I attempted to explain to the Ambassador the complete impracticability of his suggestion, but he proved extremely hard to convince. He reiterated a number of

times his firm belief and conviction that the Federal Bureau of Investigation under your direction was the only American governmental agency that could be trusted in the field of subversive activities, both foreign and domestic, at the present time. He also kept reiterating statements to the effect that illogical and unsound decisions that might be made by various people within the Government (the Ambassador apparently blames factions within the State Department for the decision and does not hesitate to voice his own very low opinion of the State Department and most of its personnel) simply cannot be permitted to result in disaster and the complete withdrawal of our FBI personnel from Latin America would, in his opinion, be disastrous. I attempted to explain to him that the FBI personnel utilized in any such plan would be considerably handicapped and, except as a functioning part of the FBI unhindered by restrictions, etc., this personnel would be at a complete loss.

I also inquired as to the reason for his, Ambassador Pawley's, very apparent strong conviction that CIG could not set up its own personnel and organization on an efficient basis, inasmuch as General Vandenberg very apparently felt that he could, doing it much more efficiently than the Bureau has been able to do it. After considerable discussion, he admitted that he could appreciate the importance of the Bureau's responsibilities in the domestic field and could appreciate the fact that the Bureau needed its personnel now serving abroad in the domestic field picture. He stated, however, that his admiration for and confidence in "Mr. Hoover" is such that he can't help but feel that Mr. Hoover can solve the domestic field problems, etc. and still spare some of the SIS personnel now serving abroad so as to avoid complete disaster in that field.

Mr. Pawley mentioned a number of times the Communist threat and his apparent firm conviction that the United States is presently engaged in the most severe crisis of its entire history from the standpoint of Communism and Russia.

I pointed out to the Ambassador that his suggestion and idea of FBI personnel continuing after the advent of CIG in any capacity whatsoever was completely impracticable and that the Bureau would resent and resist any effort from anyone to utilize FBI personnel in carrying on the CIG program. The Ambassador indicated that he is not in complete agreement with the Bureau's position in this matter. He stated that he wants to be frank but that he particularly wants the Director and the Bureau to understand his position and realize that he feels that disastrous consequences will result unless the Director and the Bureau continue in the SIS work and more or less make the CIG program work by lending Bureau personnel, etc. to the project sufficiently long to get it going on a soundly established and efficient basis.

Ambassador Pawley is very frank and a sincere admirer of you and of the Bureau. His position is quite unreasonable but it is very apparently based upon his obvious feeling that the FBI is the one really reliable and trustworthy agency in connection with Communism and subversive activities generally. He is extremely frank in stating that regardless of whose idea and whose decision it may be, CIG cannot succeed without continued help and assistance from the FBI

in the way of FBI trained personnel. He remarked quite frankly that if CIG is in reality the personal decision and desire of the President, "we will have to make it work" and added that the FBI will have to do most of the making it work. He mentioned his intention of calling upon you upon the occasion of his next visit to Washington and also stated that he is going to write you a personal letter outlining his viewpoint and his views with regard to the entire situation. He stated that he particularly desired that you understand his position and not consider him in any way hostile or antagonistic to you or to the Bureau, that he is merely attempting at all costs to insure participation by the Bureau and its personnel in future intelligence operations due to his firm conviction that the work is indispensable and FBI participation is necessary.

ACTION

The above-described personnel being withdrawn from Brazil are departing en route to the United States despite Ambassador Pawley's protest. I think that Ambassador Pawley understands the Bureau's position and do not contemplate any additional protests with regard to transfer or recall of our personnel. I do think that he will continue to advocate, first, that the FBI continue in Latin America as at present without change; and, secondly, that if he cannot attain first objective he will advocate use of FBI personnel in some capacity, advisory or otherwise, in assisting the new CIG setup and in his own words, "making it work."

THE DIRECTOR

C. H. CARSON

INTERVIEW WITH WILLARD L. BEAULAC,
UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR TO PARAGUAY

Upon the occasion of my recent visit to Paraguay, I interviewed Mr. Willard L. Beaulac, United States Ambassador, on August 13, 1946, and explained to him the Bureau's position with regard to present developments in the foreign intelligence picture. It will be recalled that Mr. Beaulac has been a particularly strong supporter and advocate of the Bureau and its work in Latin America since the time of his original transfer from Madrid, Spain, to Paraguay as Ambassador in August, 1944. It will be recalled that Mr. Beaulac protested very strongly the proposed closing of our offices during 1945, and further that he has protested to Assistant Secretary of State Braden concerning the current CIG plan. It will be further recalled that Ambassador Beaulac has requested the Bureau to defer the recall of Special Agent Leo Brenneisen, present Legal Attache in Paraguay. I explained very carefully to Mr. Beaulac the reasons, etc. necessitating the recall and transfer of Mr. Brenneisen and he stated that he fully understands the Bureau's position and while he deplores the loss of so experienced and valuable a Legal Attache as Brenneisen, he naturally defers to the judgment, etc. of you and the Bureau in connection with the transfer.

Mr. Beaulac was exceedingly outspoken in his denunciation of the CIG plan and he was particularly insistent that in his opinion the decision is not final, that it can be changed, and must be changed by pressure from the State Department that the Bureau continue in Latin America as in the past. I pointed out to him that the decision is final insofar as the Bureau is concerned and that you are perfectly willing to abide by the decision that we withdraw to permit CIG taking over, never having solicited the work. Beaulac stated that he realizes full well the fact that you have not solicited this work and have refused in any way whatsoever to lobby for it. He stated that he has occasion to know this inasmuch as Dr. Corrigan, the present Ambassador in Venezuela, Assistant Secretary of State Braden, and others began a campaign within the State Department during 1945 to obtain a clear-cut decision continuing the FBI in Latin America, as well as elsewhere in foreign intelligence work. He stated that he personally was convinced that they were on the verge of success in these efforts until the recent message was received from Mr. Braden outlining the proposed CIG setup. Mr. Beaulac was particularly bitter with regard to the fact that such a decision had been made without consulting American Ambassadors and other ranking Embassy officials in Latin America who are most interested and who are most familiar with the work of the FBI. He stated quite frankly that while he was not questioning my information or the accuracy thereof, he himself did not believe that the decision was final and intended to keep protesting in an effort to effect a change in the present plan of procedure concerning CIG.

Mr. Beaulac stated that he has received information from Washington to the effect that the CIG will be more or less a continuation of the old OSS insofar

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Carson
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Mr. Nease
Miss Gandy

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 4-7-97 BY SP3/AM/m

58 SEP 30 1946

Memorandum for the Director

as personnel, policies, procedures, etc. are concerned. He voiced bitter condemnation of the old OSS idea and plan of foreign intelligence. He took approximately thirty minutes to describe to me in detail his previous unfortunate experiences with OSS people in Madrid during the war up until the time of his transfer in August, 1944. He stated that in the American Embassy in Madrid during the regime of OSS it was necessary that foreign service officers actually be assigned full time to the task of keeping the Ambassador and other ranking Embassy officials advised as to the activities of the OSS representatives. He described these as being completely impossible and intolerable. He stated that he himself, as well as the foreign career service, is bitterly opposed and will continue to be opposed to the entire idea and conception of an overall, independent intelligence organization as encompassed in the OSS and CIG organizational setup. He stated quite frankly that he was a sufficiently loyal foreign service career officer to have been opposed to any other agency entering the field of foreign intelligence inasmuch as in his opinion foreign intelligence, fundamentally speaking, is the proper function of the foreign career service itself. He stated that he changed his mind to some extent and became entirely sold on the FBI methods of operation and the efficacy of the FBI plan of procedure after becoming acquainted with our work at first hand in Asuncion, Paraguay, following his transfer from Madrid, Spain. He stated that he has been impressed tremendously by FBI efficiency and its personnel to such an extent that he does realize a vital need for a foreign intelligence service of the kind being performed by the FBI. He stated that he means by this that the foreign intelligence must be coordinated within each Embassy abroad, as well as in Washington, and that this is definitely being done by the FBI; that the OSS conception was entirely different; and that he knows that the CIG idea is basically in conflict with the proper coordinating function of our Embassies in intelligence work. He stated that in his opinion the CIG concept has no real opportunity of succeeding inasmuch as it is basically unsound; that he will continue to oppose it; and that he is virtually sure that the State Department, as well as other interested departments, will eventually, if not in the beginning, oppose and defeat this idea and concept of foreign intelligence work.

Mr. Beaulac was extremely warm in his praise of the current Legal Attache, Mr. Brenneisen, and of the former Legal Attache, the late Special Agent Delworth, who it will be recalled was killed in an airplane crash last December. He remarked upon the splendid cooperation which he has always received from our office in Asuncion and stated that during the recent revolution in Paraguay, Mr. Brenneisen kept him thoroughly and accurately informed as to the revolution and all of the details needed by him, which information was reported by our office several hours before the revolution actually started. He stated that some of the best work that he has ever experienced in his foreign service has been performed by Police Liaison Officer Newell Williams in working out friendly relations, etc. with the Paraguayan Police. Mr. Beaulac met you upon the occasion of his last visit to Washington, and he remarked a number of times as to how tremendously he was impressed with you and with his tour of the Bureau after leaving your office.

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
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Mr. Hendon
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Mr. Nease
Miss Gandy

Memorandum for the Director

Mr. Beaulac is an exceptionally fine type of foreign service career officer, and it is believed that he will receive in the future much more important assignments than his present one as Ambassador to Paraguay. His last word to me upon my departure was that he has not given up the fight to block the CIC and to retain FBI services in foreign intelligence and that he will not give up this fight despite my assurances to him that you and the Bureau are perfectly happy and willing to abide by the decision as already made.

ACTION:

Special Agent Leo Brenneisen and his wife have already departed Asuncion on their way to the United States. Ambassador Beaulac was particularly impressed by Brenneisen and hated very much to lose his services. I do think, however, that he thoroughly understands and appreciates the Bureau's position and that he will continue to be a sincere and ardent admirer of you and the FBI.

CHC:mrl

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Carson
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Mr. Nease
Miss Gandy

THE DIRECTOR

August 22, 1946

C. H. Carson (

Interview with Robert Scotten,
United States Ambassador to Ecuador

Pursuant to your instructions, I interviewed Mr. Robert Scotten, the American Ambassador to Ecuador, upon the occasion of my visit to Ecuador on July 28, 1946. I outlined in detail to Mr. Scotten the Bureau's position with regard to foreign intelligence and the fact that the CIG had been set up to coordinate all foreign intelligence work. I explained to him that apparently upon the desire and recommendation of General Vandenberg, present Director of the CIG, it had been decided by the NIA and by the President that the CIG would establish its own operating group and would supplant the FBI in Latin America.

Mr. Scotten, it will be recalled, has in the past been a very strong and outspoken advocate of the FBI continuing its Latin American intelligence program. He expressed dismay and amazement, stating that he simply could not understand why any such decision was made regardless of who recommended it or who was in favor of it. He expressed resentment that any such decision was made before a check on the part of the responsible officials was made with American Ambassadors since the opinions of the Ambassadors should have certainly carried considerable weight in deciding whether the FBI should continue or whether some other group should come in to carry on the work. He was very outspoken in expressing doubt that the CIG would have any hope of success and expressed the firm conviction that even should the CIG eventually succeed in establishing some reasonable degree of efficient coverage, it would inevitably mean a loss of efficiency and a loss of valuable service to the United States Government during the period when the CIG was getting itself established, which would require in the opinion of Ambassador Scotten a period of several years.

The Ambassador inquired as to the CIG's plans of operation, including their plan for recruiting personnel, etc., and he was advised that the Bureau is not aware of CIG's detailed plans although they do presumably intend to operate in American Embassies abroad. The Ambassador was told I assumed CIG was negotiating with the State Department concerning these operations and the matter of securing the necessary clearance from the Ambassadors and such clearance as might be deemed necessary from the local governments. I explained to him that I did not know their plans for recruiting personnel except that some inquiry was made as to whether the Bureau would be agreeable to an absorption of Bureau personnel, and that in response to this inquiry you had indicated definitely that the Bureau would not agree to any absorption of its personnel inasmuch as the Bureau needs its personnel and will naturally utilize same in connection with its very heavy and pressing responsibilities, intelligence and otherwise, in the domestic field. The Ambassador stated that he certainly understood the Bureau's position in this matter.

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
Mr. Clegg _____
Mr. Glavin _____
Mr. Nichols _____
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Mr. Harbo _____
Mr. Hendon _____
Mr. Pennington _____
Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
Mr. Nease _____
Miss Gandy _____

He inquired as to the actual date when the Bureau will withdraw its people entirely from Quito and close the office and I explained to him the current

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Memorandum for the Director

negotiations with CIG as to a date, explaining to the Ambassador that the Bureau was attempting with considerable difficulty and hardship to cooperate in keeping our offices open on as an efficient basis as possible until CIG was prepared to actually move in and assume the responsibility. The extreme difficulty and delicacy of continued operations on our part in Ecuador and elsewhere in view of the present status of things was explained to the Ambassador carefully, and he expressed complete understanding of the Bureau's position and agreed that if CIG is going to operate it should take over as soon as possible. He reiterated, however, a number of times his own belief that the decision is not final and that it will be changed as a result of the pressure being brought to bear by American Ambassadors in Latin America and others.

The Bureau's previous difficulty in obtaining any definite decision and the hardship that it has caused to us and to our personnel was explained to the Ambassador and he agreed that the Bureau's position has been intolerable in the past due to the indecision and failure of the responsible government officials to make up their minds as to just what the Bureau should do. The Ambassador stated that he intended to make his position known that the Bureau should not withdraw; that the Bureau cannot withdraw without endangering any worthwhile intelligence coverage; and that there should be no change in present operations under the Bureau in Latin America. I explained to the Ambassador that the decision has been made, that the Bureau is perfectly willing to comply with the decision, that the Director has never solicited SIS and is not soliciting it now although the Bureau had not attempted to get out of it until General Vandenberg had expressed his desire and plans to take over and supplant us, which were approved by the NIA and the President; further that the Bureau is definitely going to withdraw although we are attempting to negotiate a certain date with CIG in order to cooperate to the fullest extent possible despite the obvious hardship and incongruity of future operations. The Ambassador was entirely sympathetic and agreeable with the sole exception of the matter of Special Agent O'Mara's recall.

It will be remembered that Special Agent O'Mara has been serving for some years in Ecuador and has apparently made himself extremely important to the Ambassador. Scotten takes a completely unreasonable view and attitude with regard to the recall of Special Agent O'Mara. He states that O'Mara is absolutely indispensable to him and that he simply does not know what he would do without O'Mara's services during the immediate future when revolution and other political difficulties are expected in Ecuador. I explained to Mr. Scotten that the Bureau has need for O'Mara's services elsewhere and that the Bureau must insist upon the finality of O'Mara's recall at this time. He was extremely disappointed and indicated that he would not take my word upon it as final any more than he would accept his present information as to the FBI's discontinuing in Latin America as being final. Ambassador Scotten's attitude with regard to Special Agent O'Mara is clearly unreasonable and obviously selfish. According to information obtained from other personnel in Ecuador, Scotten has come to rely upon O'Mara almost completely insofar as all

Memorandum for the Director

information obtained by the Ambassador is concerned and he is apparently panic-stricken at the idea of experiencing the almost certain political violence and confusion in the next several months in Ecuador.

It will be recalled that upon one previous occasion Ambassador Scotten violently protested the recall of O'Mara and this recall was canceled, not because of the Ambassador's protests, but because we canceled the recall of all personnel upon being given the go ahead signal for the current fiscal year. It is thought, however, that he will continue to protest the recall of O'Mara and the discontinuance of the FBI office, probably until the actual closing of our office and the withdrawal of all personnel. The matter of explaining to him the importance of the Bureau's domestic work and responsibilities and the need of O'Mara in connection therewith was to some extent a waste of time inasmuch as Scotten is sufficiently selfish to be primarily concerned with the setup in Ecuador and his own responsibilities therewith to the exclusion of everything else.

ACTION:

It will be recalled that Special Agent O'Mara within the past several days left Washington to return to Ecuador for the purpose of settling personal affairs and will thereafter return to the United States. I do not think there should be any change in this situation and that O'Mara should definitely be returned to the United States immediately upon his handling his personal affairs, etc. Ambassador Scotten will probably continue to protest this action. However, he is in my opinion a sincere friend of the Director and the FBI.

CHC:mr1

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
Mr. Clegg _____
Mr. Glavin _____
Mr. Ladd _____
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Mr. Harbo _____
Mr. Hendon _____
Mr. Pennington _____
Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
Mr. Nease _____
Miss Gandy _____

cc - Mr. Tamm
Mr. Ladd

THE DIRECTOR

August 22, 1946

C. H. Carson

INTERVIEW WITH THOMAS H. LOCKETT
COUNSELOR OF UNITED STATES EMBASSY
BOGOTA, COLOMBIA

Upon the occasion of my visit to Bogota, I attempted to secure an interview with United States Ambassador, John C. Wiley. However, he was absent for an indefinite period visiting a number of localities in the interior of Colombia and was not available for interview. Inasmuch as the matter of awaiting his return would probably have entailed a delay of several weeks, I interviewed in his absence a Mr. Thomas H. Lockett, Counselor of the Embassy and the official in charge of the Embassy during Mr. Wiley's absence.

I explained to Mr. Lockett in detail the Bureau's position with regard to world-wide intelligence and the fact that General Vandenberg, Director of CIG, has secured approval to establish an organization within CIG to supplant the Bureau in Latin American intelligence work. I explained to Mr. Lockett that you desired Ambassador Wiley and the ranking officials within the Bogota Office to understand the Bureau's position in connection with the matter, inasmuch as the Bureau has no alternative but to withdraw from this work just as soon as we can work out an agreeable plan with the CIG for us to withdraw and for them to take over.

Mr. Lockett was most cordial. He was very high in his praise of FBI work and he outlined to me the recent strong protests that Ambassador Wiley had made to the State Department with regard to the prospect of the FBI's withdrawal from SIS. Mr. Lockett stated that Ambassador Wiley has not given up as yet and that he will continue to make himself heard upon any possible occasion in protesting any change in the present setup of SIS operations of the FBI. I explained to Mr. Lockett that it was my understanding that the decision had been made and approved by the President and that the decision so far as the FBI is concerned is final, but that I particularly did not want to be understood as lobbying for any pressure for us to continue, that the Bureau is perfectly willing to withdraw and was attempting to cooperate with CIG in working out a harmonious closing of our offices to the best interest of all concerned, although continued operations would be obviously difficult, dangerous, delicate, and to some extent, unavoidably inefficient, inasmuch as the Bureau is unable to make the necessary plans, commitments, et cetera, for efficient long-time operation.

Mr. Lockett stated that he understood the Bureau's position. He inquired if there were a possibility of cancelling the recall of Legal Attache E. O. Johnson, and it was explained to him that Mr. Johnson's recall could not be cancelled, that Johnson had been given an assignment in the Bureau's Domestic Field where his services are needed and that even though the Bureau had continued to operate in SIS, it would have had to make various adjustments, transfers, et cetera, of its personnel as it has in the past. He mentioned the fact that Ambassador Wiley had recently requested the Bureau to reconsider Mr. Johnson's recall, but stated that he was sure that the Ambassador would understand and appreciate the Bureau's

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position in regard to the matter. He was obviously apprehensive as to the CIG setup and the CIG plans of operation and inquired particularly as to whether the Bureau knew much about just what personnel, etc., CIG planned to use in Latin America. I explained to him that CIG had not taken the Bureau into its confidence with regard to detailed plans of operation, and that I did not know CIG's plans with regard to personnel. I explained to Mr. Lockett that the Director had found it necessary to make the Bureau's position very clear to the effect that any attempt to obtain FBI personnel for the carrying on of the program of CIG would be strongly and vigorously resisted. Mr. Lockett stated that he certainly understood and appreciated the Director's position in connection with any such attempt and laughingly remarked that when the recent circular wire was obtained in the Embassy from Assistant Secretary of State Braden, stating that efforts were being made to work out a gradual overlapping in order that CIG might take over without loss and efficiency, which circular wire also indicated CIG's plans to take over certain FBI personnel presently working in Latin America in behalf of the new program, Ambassador Wiley remarked that he, the Ambassador, did not think his good friend "John Edgar" would agree to any such proposal and that he, the Ambassador, certainly agreed with Mr. Hoover.

I explained to Mr. Lockett that the Bureau, in the first place, needed its personnel, all of whom have been trained in all types of FBI operations, and that, in the second place, the Director certainly cannot understand why any effort could be made to take over FBI personnel when General Vandenberg obviously desires and plans to set up his own organization, presumably on the theory that it will be more efficient than the FBI operations. He expressed extreme doubt that CIG could actually take up the work and carry it on with any reasonable degree of efficiency and expressed his own frank, personal opinion to the effect that should the FBI actually withdraw, the State Department should attempt to carry on alone without any assistance from CIG or anyone else.

Lockett is, of course, a career man and this, generally speaking, would probably be the position of the diplomatic career service. He was obviously apprehensive as to how CIG would actually fit into foreign embassies and just how the new setup would work. He stated that he frankly had been strongly opposed to the idea of the FBI's coming into foreign embassies abroad, but that FBI personnel had proved to him that Bureau operations could be carried on to the benefit of all without embarrassment or conflict with the regular diplomatic setup and its functions. He expressed doubt that any other organization could work as harmoniously with the career service and with the Embassy setup as the FBI. He mentioned the fact that Ambassador Wiley and the other ranking Embassy officials had come to rely exclusively upon the FBI personnel for certain types of information, namely, subversive, as well as secretive political information, and other types of data which are ordinarily obtainable only by use of professional investigative methods and procedure. He explained that prior to the advent of the FBI regularly accredited diplomats had made some effort to obtain this type of data on their own but that during the recent years they have come to rely entirely upon the Office of the Legal Attache, and that the withdrawal of the Legal Attache and other FBI personnel would result in severe loss of information and data sorely

needed by each embassy in order to properly carry on the work of the Government. He mentioned our work with the local Colombian police through police liaison agents, stating that in his opinion this work had proved to be invaluable and that certainly no agency other than the FBI could hope to carry it on with any degree of success.

Mr. Lockett impressed me as being sincerely grieved and disappointed with regard to FBI withdrawal from Latin America in accordance with the CIG plan and decision.

ACTION

Former Legal Attache E. O. Johnson has already departed Bogota, he having left since my visit to Bogota. While I realize that this was a very bitter pill and disappointment to Ambassador Wiley, as well as to Counselor of the Embassy, Lockett, I am of the opinion that Mr. Wiley and Lockett will continue to be strong friends and supporters of the FBI. I think that these men will continue to protest FBI withdrawal for the purpose of being supplanted by CIG.

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. A. J. _____
Mr. Clegg _____
Mr. Glavin _____
Mr. Ladd _____
Mr. Nichols _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Tracy _____
Mr. Carson _____
Mr. Egan _____
Mr. Gurnea _____
Mr. Harbo _____
Mr. Hendon _____
Mr. Pennington _____
Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
Mr. Nease _____
Miss Gandy _____

Mr. Tolson ✓
 Mr. E. A. Tamm ✓
 Mr. Clegg ✓
 Mr. Coffey ✓
 Mr. Glavin ✓
 Mr. Ladd ✓
 Mr. Nichols ✓
 Mr. Rosen ✓
 Mr. Tracy ✓
 Mr. Carson ✓
 Mr. Egan ✓
 Mr. Hendon ✓
 Mr. Pennington ✓
 Mr. Quinn Tamm ✓
 Mr. Nease ✓
 Miss Gandy ✓

F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
 [DECODED COPY] ✓

FROM RIO DE JANEIRO

[9-9-46

NR 154 5:40 PM EST ✓

AMBASSADOR PAWLEY TODAY ADVISED HE DIRECTED LETTER DATED AUGUST 29 ✓
 TO DIRECTOR SETTING FORTH HIS COMMENTS ON OUR PRESENT STATUS.
 AMBASSADOR PLANS TO TRAVEL TO STATES END OF SEPTEMBER AT WHICH
 TIME HE WILL CALL ON DIRECTOR, EISENHOWER, AND PRESIDENT IN LAST
 EFFORT TO KEEP F.B.I. IN LATIN AMERICA. IF THIS CANNOT BE DONE
 HE DESIRES THAT TRANSITION PERIOD TO BE MADE LONG ENOUGH TO GIVE
 CIG ADEQUATE TIME TO ORGANIZE. HE IS NOT IN FAVOR OF ARMY CONTROL
 OR INFLUENCE OVER CIG AND HE STATES THAT HE ADVISED BOTH EISENHOWER
 AND VANDENBERG THAT F.B.I. WAS ONLY ORGANIZATION TRAINED AND
 EQUIPPED TO HANDLE INTELLIGENCE. THROUGHOUT CONFERENCE TODAY
 AMBASSADOR SPOKE VERY HIGHLY OF DIRECTOR.

NOTE: UNDERLINED WORD BELIEVED OMITTED FROM MESSAGE. AWAITING
 CORRECTION.

RECEIVED

[9-9-46

5:49 PM EST MET ✓

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 CLASSIFIED BY SP-10/10/10
 DECLASSIFY ON: 25 ✓

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EX-102 SEP 25 1946 ✓

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated
 outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in
 order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems ✓

OCT 2 1946 ✓

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ✓

Central Intelligence Group

August 12, 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

SP2/Alm/mg 4.7.01
 ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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 DATE 11-19-87

Pursuant to the appointment arranged by you with [redacted] Mr. Tamm consulted with [redacted] this morning. [redacted] was informed that I was endeavoring, in accord with your desires, to assist in every practical way to arrange for the transfer of the Latin American coverage to the Central Intelligence Group but that there were certain elements and factors about which it was felt [redacted] should be advised. He was informed that some months ago, in accord with your authorization, I had drawn up a schedule for a worldwide intelligence service under the Bureau's direction, which contemplated the use of some 650 agents, at an annual cost of ten million dollars, with the cost of operation concealed within the Bureau's appropriation to avoid publicity with reference thereto. It was pointed out that this plan had not been acceptable, but that the Bureau had, after the Central Intelligence Group was established, been virtually evicted from South America.

[redacted] was informed that when General Vandenberg was asked whether he desired to take over the Latin American coverage, he stated that he did desire to do so, but when I had attempted to initiate a program of withdrawing the FBI staff from South America, this withdrawal had been opposed except on an unacceptable long-term basis. It was pointed out to [redacted] that this placed the Bureau in a position where its Agents were not good enough to remain in South America but at the same time their services were, at least at this time, indispensable. It was pointed out to [redacted] that it is impossible to maintain the morale and efficiency of the Bureau Agents on Latin American assignments on a high basis due to the fact that their interest was bound to lag in the knowledge of their pending return to domestic responsibilities, and that as a result the whole spirit of the Bureau's SIS Division was bogging down.

[redacted] was advised that the Bureau had, upon Mr. Roosevelt's direction, placed in operation in Latin America virtually overnight an efficient intelligence service. [redacted]

SENT FROM D. O.
 TIME 5:00
 DATE 8/12/46
 BY K

EAT:DS

53 OCT 2 1946

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It was pointed out to [] that while Bureau Agents were apparently not good enough to continue in the Latin American intelligence field, the persons designated by General Vandenberg to work with the Bureau in turning over the SIS responsibilities to the Central Intelligence Group were ex-FBI Agents who had deserted the Bureau's service in time of war for personal reasons and were definitely persona non grata to the Bureau.

[] indicated that it was President Truman's desire to establish a worldwide intelligence service and to relieve the Bureau of all of its foreign responsibilities in the interest of enabling the Bureau to discharge its domestic responsibilities. He stated that the President and he were of the opinion that the Bureau should continue to maintain agents in any part of the world deemed necessary for the facilitating of the discharge of the Bureau's domestic responsibilities. b3

[] was advised of the fact that many of the Latin American Ambassadors are protesting against the withdrawal of the Bureau but that I would not permit our agents to plan with them any program of opposition.

To summarize the Bureau's overall position, [] was informed that I am making every effort to coordinate the Bureau's program of withdrawal with CIG's program of taking over, but that I was convinced that the CIG was stalling. [] is of the opinion that General Vandenberg and his group are stalling and indicated that he would take this entire matter up with General Vandenberg upon the latter's return to the United States in order to facilitate, expedite and clarify this situation. [] was assured that the Bureau has no desire to be arbitrary or stubborn in this situation but will do everything possible to bring about an expeditious clarification of the entire change-over program.

Respectfully,

John Edgar Hoover
Director

July 31, 1946

RECORDED

62-80750-190X

Lieutenant General Hoyt S. Vandenberg
EX-44 Director
Central Intelligence Group
Room 2166
New War Department Building
21st and Virginia Avenue, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

Dear General Vandenberg:

Pursuant to the request made by [redacted] of your office, I desire to advise you as follows concerning the property which will be made available to your organization by our office in Ciudad Trujillo, Dominican Republic.

The Legal Attache of that office is presently preparing an inventory of property on hand which will include the usual office equipment as well as an automobile. A copy of this inventory will be made available to you as soon as it is received. As you have been previously advised, our office at Ciudad Trujillo will close on August 16 and it would be appreciated if you would advise me what disposition should be made of the property to be left at that point for the CIG.

For your further information, the Military Attache has advised that the office space presently occupied by the Legal Attache at Ciudad Trujillo will be available for rent after August 16.

Sincerely yours,

JPB:mgl

W. L. ...
JUL 31 1946
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Carson
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Mr. Nease
Miss Gandy

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE

58 AUG 20 1946

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DEPT. OF JUSTICE
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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. D. M. Ladd

DATE: July 31, 1946

FROM : C. H. Carson

SUBJECT: Property to be Transferred to CIG
Ciudad Trujillo, Dom. Rep.

Mr. Tolson	
Mr. E. A. Tamm	
Mr. Clegg	
Mr. Coffey	
Mr. Glavin	
Mr. Ladd	
Mr. Nichols	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Tracy	
Mr. Carson	
Mr. Egan	
Mr. Gurnea	
Mr. Hendon	
Mr. Pennington	
Mr. Quinn Tamm	
Tele. Room	
Mr. Nease	
Miss Beahm	
Miss Gandy	

BACKGROUND:

CIG has requested that such property that still is available at the Dominican Republic office be preserved and turned over to them on the same basis as is being done for other offices. It will be recalled that our office there had already been instructed to close and to dispose of the property on hand.

DETAILS:

By cablegram dated July 30, 1946, the Legal Attache has advised that such property that is not being returned to the Bureau will be available for CIG. He has also advised that an inventory of this property will be submitted immediately, and he requested to be advised if the property should be turned over to the Embassy to be held in custody for the Central Intelligence Group. It may be noted that CIG has indicated they would not have a man on hand when that office closes on August 16. In addition, the Legal Attache has stated that the space he presently occupies will be available for rent if his office closes.

I do not believe we should leave our property in the custody of the Embassy to be held for CIG unless they specifically ask us to do so. I suggest, therefore, that we ascertain their desires in the matter after advising them that the property will be available on the 16th.

ACTION:

There is attached hereto a suggested letter to CIG. There is also attached a suggested cablegram to the Dominican Republic office advising the Legal Attache that he will be informed of the proper disposition to be made of his inventory.

Attachments

JPB:mg1

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4/1/97 BY SP8/ALM/m6

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. LADD *[Signature]*

FROM : E. G. Fitch *[Signature]*

SUBJECT: Central Intelligence Group

DATE: September 19, 1946

b3

Mr. Tolson _____

Mr. E. A. Tamm _____

Mr. Clegg _____

Mr. Coffey _____

Mr. Glavin _____

Mr. Ladd _____

Mr. Nichols _____

Mr. Rosen _____

Mr. Tracy _____

Mr. Acers _____

Mr. Carson _____

Mr. Harbo _____

Mr. Hendon _____

Mr. Mumford _____

Mr. Starke _____

Mr. Quinn Tamm _____

Tele. Room _____

Mr. Nease _____

Miss Beahm _____

Miss Gandy _____

JFD:rhr

52 OCT 3 1946

RECORDED 62-80750-191

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4-7-97 BY SP-1/M/116

SEP 25 1946

Date: September 10, 1946

PERSONAL AND ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
BY SPECIAL MESSENGER

To: Mr. Jack Neal
Chief

Division of Foreign Activity Correlation
Department of State

Central Intelligence Group

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director - Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: Transmittal of Letters to Ambassador Joseph F. McGuirk
and Ambassador William Dawson

There are transmitted herewith letters to the Honorable
Joseph F. McGuirk and to the Honorable William Dawson which it will be
appreciated if you will cause to be delivered through official channels.

Attachment

EX-113
VPK:mrl/mjj

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Carson
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Mr. Nease
Miss Gandy

SEP 11 1946 P.M.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

RECORDED

62-80752

37 SEP 28 1946

193
RECEIVED DIRECTOR
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE
6 00 PM '46

52 OCT 7 1946

EX-113
SEP 11 1946
44-7-97
sp2/Ala/MSB

September 10, 1946

~~PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL~~

Honorable Joseph P. McGuirk
Department of State
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Ambassador:

As you have previously been advised, due to the desire of the Central Intelligence Group, headed by General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, to take over intelligence coverage in Latin America, the Federal Bureau of Investigation is withdrawing from this field and will turn over all responsibility for intelligence coverage to the Central Intelligence Group. In view of the plans of the Central Intelligence Group, it was necessary to close the Office of the Legal Attache in the Dominican Republic.

I want to take this occasion to express my sincere appreciation for your splendid cooperation during the years that the Federal Bureau of Investigation operated in the Latin American intelligence field. Your assistance contributed materially to the success of our operations during the difficult war years. May I express my sincere thanks to you for members of my staff and myself.

With best wishes and kind regards,

Sincerely yours,

VPK:mr1/mjj

SEP 11 1946 P.M.

SEP 11 9 14 AM '46
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE
RECEIVED-DIRECTOR

62-80750-193

ENCLOSURE

Mr. Tolson	
Mr. E. A. Tamm	
Mr. Clegg	
Mr. Glavin	
Mr. Ladd	
Mr. Nichols	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Tracy	
Mr. Carson	
Mr. Egan	
Mr. Gurnea	
Mr. Harbo	
Mr. Hendon	
Mr. Pennington	
Mr. Quinn Tamm	
Mr. Nease	
Miss Gandy	

September 10, 1946

~~PERSONAL AND
CONFIDENTIAL~~

Honorable William Dawson
Department of State
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Ambassador:

As you have already been advised, the Central Intelligence Group, headed by General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, has decided to take over intelligence coverage in Latin America. In view of this decision, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, of course, is preparing to withdraw its personnel from this field and turn over responsibility to the Central Intelligence Group.

I want to take this occasion to express my sincere appreciation for your splendid cooperation during the years that the Federal Bureau of Investigation operated in the Latin American intelligence field. Your assistance contributed materially to the success of our operations during the difficult war years. I am indeed appreciative of the personal interest displayed by you in the difficult problem of intelligence coverage in Latin America faced by this Bureau when it took over such work in 1940. I want to express my sincere thanks to you for myself and all the members of my staff.

With best wishes and kind regards,

Sincerely,

VPK:mrl/mjj

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Carson
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Mr. Nease
Miss Gandy

SEP 11 1946

RECEIVED DIRECTOR
U. S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE
SEP 11 6 11 AM '46

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

62-80750-193

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: September 20 1946

FROM : D. M. Ladd

SUBJECT:

Central Intelligence Group

I talked to Fred Lyon today with reference to [REDACTED]

Mr. Tolson ✓
 Mr. E. A. Tamm
 Mr. Clegg
 Mr. Glavin
 Mr. Ladd
 Mr. Nichols
 Mr. Rosen
 Mr. Tracy
 Mr. Carson
 Mr. Egan
 Mr. Gurnea
 Mr. Harbo
 Mr. Hendon
 Mr. Pennington
 Mr. Quinn Tamm
 Tele. Room
 Mr. Nease
 Miss Beahm
 Miss Gandy

b3

Mr. Lyon stated he would do a little checking and find out what was back of this whole thing however.

DML:da

RECORDED

162-80750-194
F B I
37 SEP 26 1946

EX-71

57 OCT 3 1946

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 DATE 4-7-97 BY SP2/AM/inf

THE DIRECTOR

August 22, 1946

Mr. C. H. Carson

INTERVIEW WITH MR. JOSEPH FLACK
UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR TO BOLIVIA

While in La Paz, Bolivia, on August 1, 1946, I interviewed United States Ambassador Flack and explained to him the Bureau's position with regard to foreign intelligence at the present time.

I outlined to Mr. Flack the fact that the Central Intelligence Group under General Vandenberg, its Director, is organizing an intelligence service to supplant the Bureau in Latin America in accordance with the recommendations and desires of General Vandenberg which have been approved by the NIA and the President.

Mr. Flack was advised that the Bureau is naturally in a difficult and delicate position at the present time inasmuch as it is extremely difficult for us to continue to operate with any degree of efficiency due to our inability to make plans, etc. to continue on a permanent basis. Mr. Flack expressed sympathy and understanding of the Bureau's position. He was very high in his praise of our former service, stating that he had been tremendously impressed with the efficiency and reliability of our performance in Venezuela where he formerly served as Counselor of Embassy. Mr. Flack paid very high tribute to the Bureau's Office in La Paz where he has been serving for the past several months as Ambassador. He pointed out that he relies heavily upon our Office for all information of subversive intelligence nature and that he also relies upon our Office for virtually all secretive political information. He pointed out that during the recent revolution which ended approximately one week before my arrival, the Bureau's Office in Bolivia proved invaluable to the Ambassador and to the Embassy. He expressed extreme regret at the recall of Special Agent Keith Angell, the Legal Attache. However, when the Bureau's position in this matter and our contemplated retrenchment program, with the necessary transfer, etc. of personnel, was explained to him, he indicated complete understanding of the Bureau's problem and stated that he was particularly grateful that Mr. Angell was left in La Paz until August 15, 1946.

Upon the occasion of my visit, Special Agent Angell was absent, visiting tin mines within the Andean mountain interior of Bolivia at the specific request of the United States Ambassador in connection with some arbitrary imprisonment of United States mine officials and workers by Bolivian authorities. Mr. Angell was investigating this situation at the request of the Ambassador in order to provide the latter with the necessary information to take such steps as was warranted with the Bolivian Government in La Paz.

Mr. Flack was high in his praise of you and stated that he particularly appreciates a letter of congratulations which he received from you recently upon the occasion of his confirmation as United States Ambassador to Bolivia.

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Carson
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Mr. Nease
Miss Gandy

53 OCT 3 1946

Memorandum for the Director

He treasures this letter very highly and keeps it in his personal desk together with an appended copy of his reply to you. He displayed the letter to me with obvious pride and I was informed by various of our personnel assigned in Bolivia that he displays this letter upon various occasions to friends and officials who visit him.

Mr. Flack stated that he has protested the closing of our Office and the advent of CIG. He stated that he will continue to protest this and inquired as to whether, in the opinion of the writer, the matter had been finally decided or whether there remains any appreciable chance for a reversal of the decision. He stated that he would be extremely distrustful of any new group entering the field at this time, that he simply cannot understand the reason for any such step in view of the fact that the FBI has a well-organized efficient-going organization and any new successor group would necessarily take years in creating an organization such as the one presently operated by the FBI. I informed him that insofar as the Bureau was concerned, the decision is final and that you are perfectly willing to abide by the decision as made. I explained to him that you never solicited this type of work, but that you definitely did not initiate the decision whereby the Bureau was to be supplanted in Latin America by the Central Intelligence Group. Mr. Flack was extremely interested in any information possessed by the writer as to the detailed plan of operation contemplated by CIG in Latin America. I explained to him that the Bureau is not advised in detail as to CIG's plan of operation, that presumably they intended to be extremely secretive although they have indicated that they plan to take over offices within the Embassies, having requested our equipment, etc. Mr. Flack pointed out that both in Venezuela, where he previously served, and in La Paz, where he is now serving, the Office of the Legal Attache has definite diplomatic standing and that clearance was obtained during the war with appropriate officials of the Bolivian Government on a confidential basis. He pointed out that both the Venezuelan and Bolivian officials, police and otherwise, have come to know and respect the Legal Attache and other personnel in the Office of the Legal Attache. He voiced the opinion that with regard to the matter of police relations alone, the change over from FBI to CIG will mean a terrific loss to the United States Government and to the Embassy.

He repeatedly inquired as to what, if any, information was possessed by the writer as to the real, behind the scenes, reason for the decision. I explained to him the original setup of NIA and CIG insofar as was known to me and pointed out that apparently upon the advent of General Vandenberg as Director of CIG, after the resignation of Admiral Souers, General Vandenberg secured approval for his plan to set up his own independent organization. Mr. Flack repeatedly stated that he still has hope that the decision is not final and that it can be reversed.

He repeatedly expressed amazement that such a decision could have been reached in Washington on the basis of the facts known to every Ambassador

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Carson
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Mr. Nease
Miss Gandy

Memorandum for the Director

and responsible Embassy official in Latin America without consultation in any way with such officials.

He mentioned his desire to call upon you personally when he is next in Washington and stated that he has for some time looked forward to a tour of the Bureau's facilities. He was told that you would be happy to see him at any time he might call provided you are in the City and it was suggested that he arrange an appointment upon his next visit. He was cordially invited to visit the Bureau for a tour at any time it might suit his convenience.

ACTION

Special Agent Keith Angell, the former Legal Attache, has already left Bolivia; he having departed on August 15, 1946, en route to the United States.

Mr. Flack is a new Ambassador. He is a State Department career man and will undoubtedly in the future receive more important posts in the diplomatic service. He is believed to be a very sincere admirer of you and of the Bureau. He has always proved cooperative and it is believed that he will continue to cooperate with the Bureau whenever the opportunity offers.

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
Mr. Clegg _____
Mr. Glavin _____
Mr. Ladd _____
Mr. Nichols _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Tracy _____
Mr. Carson _____
Mr. Egan _____
Mr. Gurnea _____
Mr. Harbo _____
Mr. Hendon _____
Mr. Pennington _____
Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
Mr. Nease _____
Miss Gandy _____

CHC:FA

OFFICE MEMORANDUM - UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. D. M. LADD *L*

DATE: August 30, 1946

FROM : O. H. Carson *etc*SUBJECT: SIS OFFICES IN EL SALVADOR,
HONDURAS AND HAITI

It will be recalled that we have informed our personnel in the SIS office in El Salvador, Honduras and Haiti that those offices will be closed as of September 30, 1946. The Legal Attache in El Salvador, Stanton Brown, is to remain there and close the office at that time. The Legal Attache in Honduras has already been recalled and has returned to the United States. We have only one representative there at the present time, Police Liaison Agent Clark D. Anderson, who has been instructed to bring his work to a conclusion by September 30, 1946. We had planned to close the office in Haiti in June but because of representations by the State Department we agreed to keep it open through September. Our representative there is Jack West.

We have informed the State Department of our plans to close these three offices by September 30, 1946. Originally, we had intended to advise the Central Intelligence Group of the closing of these three offices immediately after August 16, 1946, which was the date on which we closed the offices in the Dominican Republic and Costa Rica. However, in view of the controversy with the NIA as to the schedule to be followed in closing out our offices and turning over the responsibilities in the various countries to CIC, this was not done.

Actually, we are in a position of maintaining offices in three unimportant countries where the present and expected return to the Bureau do not measure up to the cost of maintaining them. Prior to the time we made the arrangements with the CIC for the turning over of our responsibilities to that organization, we had considered and intended to close out various of our offices in smaller and less important Latin American countries and to provide such coverage as proved necessary from neighboring countries. The countries under discussion were included in this category. Therefore, I think the only logical conclusion is that we should go ahead and close our offices regardless of the plans of the CIC.

ACTION:

Attached is a communication to CIC advising of our plans to close these three offices on September 30, 1946, and pointing out that this step is being taken because their maintenance is not justified from a financial standpoint.

Attachement.

DVH:KK

57 OCT 3 1946

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DATE 4-7-97 BY SP5/AMG

62-80750-197

More Likely to Be Internal

Danger of Organized Fifth Column Crippling War Production Declared Greater Than Threat of External Attack

By Constantine Brown

A group of Congressmen visiting our Pacific defenses has issued a warning to the United States about the possibility of another Pearl Harbor.

In responsible military quarters in Europe, intelligence officers are on the alert for a possible "strike" message to the Red armies massed in fighting formation from Stettin to the Mediterranean in the same secret manner as the "winds message" which was Tokyo's signal for the attack on Pearl Harbor.

However, those whose job it is to follow the Russian trends believe that Moscow is counting today principally on the "fifth column" in the United States to neutralize America, whose war potential she knows is still great.

There is a parallel and a difference between the situation in 1941 and in 1946. The parallel is that while the military in the United States expected a Japanese aggression, we continued to remain disarmed.

The difference is that the American Government had considered Japan as a potential enemy since the end of the World War when, on orders from President Wilson, we prevented the Tokyo war mongers from annexing Siberia and parts of China, including Shantung. Today, in spite of its toughening-up attitude toward Moscow's demands, the United States still cannot believe that the U. S. S. R., a country helped in every conceivable manner militarily and politically, would repay our assistance by unleashing another war, with this Nation as one of the immediate targets.

Reds Could Score at Start

Ethical considerations are the basis for the hope of American diplomats and politicians that Russia will not behave in the same manner as the Japanese. Hard-boiled and realistic Air, Army and Navy men still have some hopes for peace because they cannot imagine that Stalin and those who assist him can be so blind as not to realize that the inevitable ultimate defeat of the U. S. S. R. could bring about the collapse of their regime.

There is no question that at this time the Red Army is far better prepared than the combined forces of the western democracies. It is fully mobilized and has for the time being an overwhelming superiority over the Allied forces in Europe and in Asia. Although the Red armies do not possess the motorized equipment which the western forces considered essential for victory against the Axis, their strength is such that within a few weeks they could roll back the feeble American, British and French troops policing the

- Mr. Gl.
- Mr. La
- Mr. W.
- Mr. Rd.
- Mr. Tr.
- Mr. S.
- Mr. Eg.
- Mr. Gu.
- Mr. Ha.
- Mr. Hei.
- Mr. Jor.
- Mr. Pe.
- Mr. Qu.
- Mr. Ne.
- Miss G.

July 1946

White
Wynker
Berg
Bl.

analyzed the power that he thinks it practical to diminish domestic & foreign intelligence. And a move will create a "Pearl Harbor".

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&
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1162-807
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29 SEP 26 1946

EX-32

9

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SEP 8 1946
WASHINGTON STAR
Page C-1

56 OCT 4

0 National Intelligence Authority

...Russians could hike it to the Channel within a short time after receiving the go-ahead signal from the Kremlin. They could roll Gen. J. R. Hodges' troops in Korea into the sea in a few days and could rout Chiang Kai-shek's forces and the Marines stationed in China soon after an offensive was ordered.

But initial successes are of little consequence. From September, 1939, to November, 1943, the Nazis were the unchallenged masters of Europe; yet they were defeated in the end.

Underground Groups Strong.

Russia's initial victories should Stalin be blinded by his diplomatic successes and decide on a "holy war against the western democracies" would be only temporary in the opinion of the best military minds in the United States.

Russia has managed, by its police state policies, to earn the enmity of all the nations in which she has placed satellite governments. There is an underground which many reliable observers consider more virulent and organized than that which existed during the Nazi regime in Poland, Ro-

mania, Hungary, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. In all these countries, where the Russians were received two years ago as liberators, there is a feeling of despair among the natives.

Men and women have taken to the mountains and the marshes and have organized themselves into bands called Chetniks, Hajduks, Comitadjis and many other names recalling the resistance movements of the old days. All these people have been under the yoke of the Turks, the Germans, the Austrians and the Russians for several centuries.

Although the methods of oppression of the U. S. S. R. are far more effective than those of the sultans, the czars or the emperors of the last centuries, the people in Eastern Europe and the Balkans are attempting to cope with the new regimes as best they can. For the time being they are opposing their masters by a passive resistance. But should the Soviet armies become engaged in another real war, there is no question that millions of men and women would become active and harass the Red Army's lines of communication. At the present they are poorly armed with only a few machine guns and rifles and a small amount of home-made ammunition.

In the event of a Russian aggression against the western world, they could be provided with the most up-to-date equipment, just as the Maquis and other "domestic secret armies" were equipped in the days when the Germans were conquerors.

The United States and Great Britain would require at least nine months before they could reorganize their demobilized forces, and particularly the aviation, which in the event of a conflict with the U. S. S. R. would play the most important role. But from that time on Russia's chances of winning the

Those American officials who are studying the Russian strategy at close quarters believe that the Moscow war-planners are relying on the ability of Communist-controlled union leaders to paralyze the American war effort. They are said to believe that in the event of an attempt of the United States to reply to force by force, the transport and communications unions would declare a strike which would block all military efforts of this country for a long time.

Politbureau Is Misled.

The true fact that the American people don't want to hear any more about the war and have shown a greater eagerness than any of the other war-weary countries to dismantle the Nation's military strength is being exaggerated, according to available reports in Moscow. The Politbureau listens with eagerness to the thousands of reports received from the intelligence services in the United States.

The employees of the Soviet intelligence are describing the situation in America as it appears to them on the surface. They transmit to headquarters reports about what the so-called "liberal press," the "liberal" radio commentators and the "liberal" politicians are saying. They inform Moscow about the growing feeling, intensified by a good propaganda among the people of this country, that Britain once more wants us to pull her chestnuts out of the fire.

They report that the overwhelming masses of American citizens are more interested in price regulations, the coming elections for Congress and the domestic difficulties due to slow reconversion rather than in Turkey, the future of Europe and China.

They are known to have elaborated on the vociferous demands of the American "liberal" groups to withdraw all American forces from China and eventually the Far East in order to avoid trouble. These intelligence agents tell their principals that the American people are looking for a theoretical peace and are willing to let things drift, provided the United Nations resembles, if only vaguely, the organization it was intended to be, and fundamentally nintenths of the Americans don't care a rap what is happening in the outside world.

Eyes on Transport

The agents call this "ism" an "isolationism" in describe America as rema world stage and providing t all kinds of supplies, but be to do anything drastic agaimed aggressive policy. T faire" of the American pe added the activities of th the "sensitive unions" ma have definite ties with the

The Communist party in States has been assigned a important role, particularly tion with the situation in t and communications system

A wave of strikes is report preparation for this fall tant the sensitive unions denced from a circular of t committee which says: "A campaign must be undertake gandize soldiers to cause t fuse to obey any orders th ceive to intervene in any of t strikes or disorders incide strikes. Particular emphas laid on propaganda to cat to refuse actually to opera that are strike-bound, such a and communications."

The Russians are relying a fifth column in this countr about as well organized and the Nazi fifth column was in 1940.

There is little likelihood unexpected attack as we s Pearl Harbor. The developme last few months should have military defenses on guard. It is highly unlikely tha suffer another sneak attack outside. The Pearl Harbor n ever, come from within.

SEP 8 1946

WASHINGTON STAR

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. TAMM

FROM : D. M. Ladd

SUBJECT:

DATE: September 30, 1946

Mr. Tolson	
Mr. E. A. Tamm	
Mr. Clegg	
Mr. Glavin	
Mr. Ladd	
Mr. Nichols	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Tracy	
Mr. Carson	
Mr. Egan	
Mr. Gurnea	
Mr. Harbo	
Mr. Hendon	
Mr. Pennington	
Mr. Quinn Tamm	
Tele. Room	
Mr. Nease	
Miss Beahm	
Miss Gandy	

Ambassador Corrigan of Venezuela called your office and was transferred to me in your absence. He stated that he was most anxious for the Bureau to reconsider the question of letting Mr. Santoiana remain in Venezuela until after the elections. He stated that he felt very strongly about this matter, that he was familiar with the Bureau's position in world intelligence but that he considered it extremely urgent that Santoiana be kept there by reason of his contact and knowledge of the Communist element.

I, of course, explained to the Ambassador the Bureau's position and the fact that CIC was taking over this work and that therefore the Bureau had no other recourse but to withdraw Mr. Santoiana, who was needed on other domestic assignments.

Mr. Corrigan asked that his request be called to the Director's attention. He stated that he would be at the State Department the rest of this week in Room 195, Extension 2681.

DML:da

RECORDED

56 OCT 7 - 1946

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4/8/97 BY SP2/efm/mif

62-80750-203

0 Central Intelligence Bureau

PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

Instructions:

1. Answer all questions *completely*. If question does not apply write "not applicable." Write "unknown" only if you do not know the answer and cannot obtain the answer from personal records. Use a separate sheet for extra details on *any* question or questions for which you do not have sufficient room.
2. Attach 2 recent passport size pictures to this form, date taken written on the back of each.
3. Type, print or write carefully; illegible or incomplete forms will *not* receive consideration.

HAVE YOU READ AND UNDERSTOOD THE INSTRUCTIONS?

Yes or No

SEC. 1. PERSONAL BACKGROUND

A. FULL NAME ^{Miss} _____ ^{Mr.} _____ TELEPHONE _____
^{Mrs.} _____

PRESENT ADDRESS _____
 St. & No. _____ City _____ State _____ Country _____

LEGAL RESIDENCE _____
 St. & No. _____ City _____ State _____ Country _____

B. NICKNAME _____ ANY OTHER NAMES THAT YOU HAVE USED _____

_____ UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES HAVE YOU EVER USED THESE
 NAMES? _____

HOW LONG? _____ IF A LEGAL CHANGE, GIVE PARTICULARS _____

_____ Where _____ By What Authority? _____ When _____

C. DATE OF BIRTH _____ PLACE OF BIRTH _____
 City _____ State _____ Country _____

RACIAL ORIGIN THROUGH MOTHER _____ THROUGH FATHER _____

D. PRESENT CITIZENSHIP _____ BY BIRTH? _____ BY MARRIAGE? _____

BY NATURALIZATION CERTIFICATE # _____ ISSUED _____ BY _____
 Date _____ Court _____

AT _____
 City _____ State _____ Country _____

HAVE YOU HAD A PREVIOUS NATIONALITY? _____ WHAT? _____

HELD BETWEEN WHAT DATES? _____ TO _____ ANY OTHER NATIONALITY? _____

GIVE PARTICULARS:

HAVE YOU TAKEN STEPS TO CHANGE PRESENT CITIZENSHIP?..... GIVE PARTICULARS:...

E. LAST U.S. PASSPORT: NUMBER, DATE AND PLACE OF ISSUE

HOW MANY OTHER U.S. PASSPORTS HAVE YOU HAD?..... GIVE APPROXIMATE DATES:

PASSPORTS OF OTHER NATIONS?

F. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. WHEN DID YOU FIRST ARRIVE IN THIS COUNTRY?

PORT OF ENTRY? ON PASSPORT OF WHAT COUNTRY?

LAST U.S. VISA
Number Type Place of Issue Date of Issue

SEC. 2. PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION

AGE SEX HEIGHT WEIGHT

EYES HAIR COMPLEXION SCARS

BUILD OTHER DISTINGUISHING FEATURES

SEC. 3. FATHER (Give the same information for Step-father and/or guardian on a separate sheet)

FULL NAME
First Middle Last

LIVING OR DECEASED DATE OF DECEASE CAUSE

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS
St. & No. City State Country

DATE OF BIRTH PLACE OF BIRTH
City State Country

CITIZENSHIP WHEN ACQUIRED? WHERE?
City State Country

OCCUPATION LAST EMPLOYER

EMPLOYER'S OR OWN BUSINESS ADDRESS
St. & No. City State Country

MILITARY SERVICE FROM TO BRANCH OF SERVICE
Date Date

COUNTRY DETAILS OF OTHER GOV'T SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN

SEC. 4. MOTHER (Give the same information for Step-mother on a separate sheet)

FULL NAME
First Maiden Last
LIVING OR DECEASED DATE OF DECEASE CAUSE
PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS
St. & No. City State Country
DATE OF BIRTH PLACE OF BIRTH
City State Country
CITIZENSHIP WHEN ACQUIRED? WHERE?
City State Country
OCCUPATION LAST EMPLOYER
EMPLOYER'S OR OWN BUSINESS ADDRESS
St. & No. City State Country
DETAILS OF GOV'T SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN

SEC. 5. BROTHERS AND SISTERS (Including half-, step-, and adopted brothers and sisters)

FULL NAME
First Middle Last
PRESENT ADDRESS
St. & No. City State Country
FULL NAME
First Middle Last
PRESENT ADDRESS
St. & No. City State Country
FULL NAME
First Middle Last
PRESENT ADDRESS
St. & No. City State Country

SEC. 6. MARITAL STATUS

A. SINGLE MARRIED DIVORCED WIDOWED

STATE DATE, PLACE AND REASON FOR SEPARATION OR DIVORCE

B. WIFE OR HUSBAND (IF YOU HAVE BEEN MARRIED MORE THAN ONCE USE A SEPARATE SHEET
FOR FORMER WIFE OR HUSBAND AND GIVE REQUIRED DATA FOR ALL PRE-
VIOUS MARRIAGES)

NAME PLACE &
First Middle; (for wife, maiden) Last DATE OF MARRIAGE
(HER OR HIS) ADDRESS BEFORE MARRIAGE
St. & No. City State Country
LIVING OR DECEASED DATE OF DECEASE CAUSE
PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS
St. & No. City State Country

SEC. 6. MARITAL STATUS (Cont'd)

DATE OF BIRTH..... PLACE OF BIRTH.....
City State Country
RACIAL ORIGIN THROUGH FATHER..... THROUGH MOTHER.....
CITIZENSHIP..... WHEN ACQUIRED?..... WHERE?.....
City State Country
OCCUPATION..... LAST EMPLOYER.....
EMPLOYER'S OR OWN BUSINESS ADDRESS.....
St. & No. City State Country
MILITARY SERVICE FROM..... TO..... BRANCH OF SERVICE.....
Date Date
COUNTRY..... DETAILS OF OTHER GOV'T. SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN.....
.....

SEC. 7. FATHER-IN-LAW

FULL NAME.....
First Middle Last
LIVING OR DECEASED..... DATE OF DECEASE.....
PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS.....
St. & No. City State Country
RACIAL ORIGIN..... BIRTH.....
Date City Country
CITIZENSHIP..... WHEN ACQUIRED?..... WHERE?.....
City State Country

SEC. 8. MOTHER-IN-LAW

FULL NAME.....
First Maiden Last
LIVING OR DECEASED..... DATE OF DECEASE.....
PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS.....
St. & No. City State Country
RACIAL ORIGIN..... BIRTH.....
Date City Country
CITIZENSHIP..... WHEN ACQUIRED?..... WHERE?.....
City State Country

SEC. 9. CHILDREN OR DEPENDENTS (Include partial dependents)

NAME..... RELATIONSHIP..... AGE.....
NATIONALITY..... ADDRESS.....
St. & No. City State Country
NAME..... RELATIONSHIP..... AGE.....
NATIONALITY..... ADDRESS.....
St. & No. City State Country
NAME..... RELATIONSHIP..... AGE.....
NATIONALITY..... ADDRESS.....
St. & No. City State Country

SEC. 10. RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION, WHO LIVE ABROAD, ARE UNDER THE JURISDICTION OF A FOREIGN POWER ARE NOT CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES, OR ARE MARRIED TO NON-CITIZENS:

NAME RELATIONSHIP AGE

NATIONALITY ADDRESS
St. & No. City State Country

REASON FOR LISTING UNDER THIS QUESTION

NAME RELATIONSHIP AGE

NATIONALITY ADDRESS
St. & No. City State Country

REASON FOR LISTING UNDER THIS QUESTION

NAME RELATIONSHIP AGE

NATIONALITY ADDRESS
St. & No. City State Country

REASON FOR LISTING UNDER THIS QUESTION

SEC. 11. RELATIVES BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE, IN MILITARY, NAVAL OR OTHER GOV'T SERVICE — U.S. OR FOREIGN:

NAME RELATIONSHIP AGE

NATIONALITY ADDRESS
St. & No. City State Country

TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN)

NAME RELATIONSHIP AGE

NATIONALITY ADDRESS
St. & No. City State Country

TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN)

NAME RELATIONSHIP AGE

NATIONALITY ADDRESS
St. & No. City State Country

TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN)

SEC. 12. GIVE FIVE CHARACTER REFERENCES—IN THE U.S.—(Give business addresses where possible)

NAME: ADDRESS
St. & No. City State

NAME: ADDRESS
St. & No. City State

NAME: ADDRESS
St. & No. City State

NAME: ADDRESS
St. & No. City State

NAME: ADDRESS
St. & No. City State

SEC. 13. NAMES OF 5 PERSONS WHO KNOW YOU SOCIALLY IN THE UNITED STATES. NOT REFERENCES OR EMPLOYERS—(Give business addresses where possible)

1. NAME	ADDRESS:	St. & No.	City	State
2. NAME	ADDRESS:	St. & No.	City	State
3. NAME	ADDRESS:	St. & No.	City	State
4. NAME	ADDRESS:	St. & No.	City	State
5. NAME	ADDRESS:	St. & No.	City	State

SEC. 14. GIVE *THREE* NEIGHBORS AT YOUR LAST NORMAL RESIDENCE IN THE U.S.

NAME:	ADDRESS	St. & No.	City	State
NAME:	ADDRESS	St. & No.	City	State
NAME:	ADDRESS	St. & No.	City	State

SEC. 15. EDUCATION

SCHOOL:	ADDRESS	City	State	Country
DATES ATTENDED:	DEGREE			
SCHOOL:	ADDRESS	City	State	Country
DATES ATTENDED:	DEGREE			
COLLEGE:	ADDRESS	City	State	Country
DATES ATTENDED:	DEGREE			
COLLEGE:	ADDRESS	City	State	Country
DATES ATTENDED:	DEGREE			

SEC. 16. MILITARY, NAVAL OR OTHER GOV'T SERVICE — U.S. OR FOREIGN

Country	Service	Rank	Dates
Last Station	Serial No.	Type of discharge	Com. Officer

REMARKS:

SEC. 17. SELECTIVE SERVICE STATUS

CLASSIFICATION ORDER NO. APPROX. INDUCTION DATE
BOARD NO. ADDRESS
IF DEFERRED, GIVE REASON

SEC. 18. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DISCHARGED FROM ANY POSITION, OR LEFT UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WERE NOT ENTIRELY FAVORABLE? PLEASE GIVE DETAILS:

SEC. 19. MISCELLANEOUS

DID YOU EVER HAVE OR DO YOU NOW HAVE MEMBERSHIP IN, OR SUPPORT, ANY POLITICAL PARTY OR ORGANIZATION WHICH ADVOCATES THE OVERTHROW OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL FORM OF GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES? IF "YES," EXPLAIN:

DO YOU USE, OR HAVE YOU USED INTOXICANTS?

HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED, INDICTED OR CONVICTED FOR ANY VIOLATION OF LAW OTHER THAN A MINOR TRAFFIC VIOLATION? IF SO, STATE NAME OF COURT, CITY, STATE, COUNTRY, NATURE OF OFFENSE AND DISPOSITION OF CASE

SEC. 20. FINANCIAL BACKGROUND

ARE YOU ENTIRELY DEPENDENT ON YOUR SALARY? IF NOT, STATE SOURCES OF OTHER INCOME

NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF BANKS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS

HAVE YOU EVER BEEN IN BANKRUPTCY? GIVE PARTICULARS

SEC. 20. FINANCIAL BACKGROUND (Cont'd)

GIVE *three* CREDIT REFERENCES — IN THE U.S.

NAME: ADDRESS
St. & No. City State
NAME: ADDRESS
St. & No. City State
NAME: ADDRESS
St. & No. City State

SEC. 21. CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT FOR PAST 10 YEARS. INCLUDE CASUAL EMPLOYMENT. INCLUDE ALSO PERIODS OF UNEMPLOYMENT. GIVE ADDRESS AND STATE WHAT YOU DID DURING PERIODS OF UNEMPLOYMENT. INCLUDE LAST 5 POSITIONS AND COVER AT LEAST 10 YEARS

EMPLOYER TITLE OF JOB
ADDRESS
St. & No. City State Country

YOUR DUTIES AND SPECIALTY

KIND OF BUSINESS: NAME OF SUPERVISOR

FROM: TO: SALARY \$..... PER

REASONS FOR LEAVING

EMPLOYER TITLE OF JOB
ADDRESS
St. & No. City State Country

YOUR DUTIES AND SPECIALTY

KIND OF BUSINESS: NAME OF SUPERVISOR

FROM: TO: SALARY \$..... PER

REASONS FOR LEAVING

EMPLOYER TITLE OF JOB
ADDRESS
St. & No. City State Country

YOUR DUTIES AND SPECIALTY

KIND OF BUSINESS: NAME OF SUPERVISOR

FROM: TO: SALARY \$..... PER

REASONS FOR LEAVING

SEC. 21 CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY (Cont'd)

EMPLOYER	TITLE OF JOB			
ADDRESS	St. & No.	City	State	Country
YOUR DUTIES AND SPECIALTY				
KIND OF BUSINESS:		NAME OF SUPERVISOR		
FROM:	TO:	SALARY \$.....	PER	
REASONS FOR LEAVING				

EMPLOYER	TITLE OF JOB			
ADDRESS	St. & No.	City	State	Country
YOUR DUTIES AND SPECIALTY				
KIND OF BUSINESS:		NAME OF SUPERVISOR		
FROM:	TO:	SALARY \$.....	PER	
REASONS FOR LEAVING				

SEC. 22. RESIDENCES FOR THE PAST TEN YEARS

St. & No.	City	State	Country	FROM:	TO:
St. & No.	City	State	Country	FROM:	TO:
St. & No.	City	State	Country	FROM:	TO:
St. & No.	City	State	Country	FROM:	TO:
St. & No.	City	State	Country	FROM:	TO:
St. & No.	City	State	Country	FROM:	TO:
St. & No.	City	State	Country	FROM:	TO:

SEC. 23. RESIDENCE OR TRAVEL OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES

City or Section	Country	Purpose	DATES	TO
			Month & Year	Month & Year
City or Section	Country	Purpose	DATES	TO
			Month & Year	Month & Year

SEC. 23 RESIDENCE OR TRAVEL (Cont'd)

..... City or Section	 Country	 Purpose	DATES	TO	 Month & Year	 Month & Year
..... City or Section	 Country	 Purpose	DATES	TO	 Month & Year	 Month & Year
..... City or Section	 Country	 Purpose	DATES	TO	 Month & Year	 Month & Year
..... City or Section	 Country	 Purpose	DATES	TO	 Month & Year	 Month & Year

SEC. 24. CLUBS, SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

LIST NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF ALL CLUBS, SOCIETIES, LABOR UNIONS, PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES, EMPLOYEE GROUPS, ORGANIZATIONS OF ANY KIND (INCLUDE MEMBERSHIP IN OR SUPPORT OF ANY ORGANIZATION HAVING HEADQUARTERS OR BRANCH IN A FOREIGN COUNTRY) TO WHICH YOU HAVE BELONGED:

..... Name	 St. & No.	 City	 State	 Country
..... Name	 St. & No.	 City	 State	 Country
..... Name	 St. & No.	 City	 State	 Country
..... Name	 St. & No.	 City	 State	 Country
..... Name	 St. & No.	 City	 State	 Country
..... Name	 St. & No.	 City	 State	 Country
..... Name	 St. & No.	 City	 State	 Country

SEC. 25. RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION

CHURCH OF ATTENDANCE

ADDRESS NAME OF MINISTER OR PRIEST

SEC. 26. GENERAL QUALIFICATIONS

A. FOREIGN LANGUAGES (STATE DEGREE OR PROFICIENCY AS "SLIGHT" "FAIR" OR "FLUENT")

LANGUAGE	SPEAK	READ	WRITE
LANGUAGE	SPEAK	READ	WRITE
LANGUAGE	SPEAK	READ	WRITE
LANGUAGE	SPEAK	READ	WRITE
LANGUAGE	SPEAK	READ	WRITE
WRITE	LANGUAGE	SPEAK	READ

SEC. 26 "GENERAL QUALIFICATIONS (Cont'd)

B. HAVE YOU ANY SPECIAL KNOWLEDGE OR TRAINING WITH RESPECT TO:

MOTOR VEHICLES? AIRPLANES? RADIO?

GIVE PARTICULARS

C. LIST *all* SPORTS AND HOBBIES WHICH INTEREST YOU; INDICATE DEGREE OF PROFICIENCY IN EACH.

D. HAVE YOU ANY QUALIFICATIONS, AS A RESULT OF TRAINING OR EXPERIENCE, WHICH MIGHT FIT YOU FOR A PARTICULAR POSITION?

SEC. 27. PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY:

NAME RELATIONSHIP

ADDRESS
St. & No. City State Country

(663)

SEC. 28. YOU ARE INFORMED THAT THE CORRECTNESS OF ALL STATEMENTS MADE HEREIN WILL BE INVESTIGATED, AND YOU ARE INVITED TO MAKE ANY CHANGES (OR ADDITIONS) IN YOUR STATEMENTS THAT YOU MAY THINK ADVISABLE.

- A. ARE THERE ANY UNFAVORABLE INCIDENTS IN YOUR LIFE NOT MENTIONED ABOVE WHICH MAY BE DISCOVERED IN SUBSEQUENT INVESTIGATION, WHETHER YOU WERE DIRECTLY INVOLVED OR NOT, WHICH MIGHT REQUIRE EXPLANATION? IF SO, DESCRIBE. IF NOT, ANSWER, "NO."

.....
.....
.....

- B. I CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING ANSWERS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF, AND I AGREE THAT ANY MISSTATEMENT OR OMISSION AS TO A MATERIAL FACT WILL CONSTITUTE GROUNDS FOR IMMEDIATE DISMISSAL.

SIGNED AT DATE
City and State

.....
Witness Signature of applicant

Applicant will not write below

COMMENTS OF INTERVIEWER:

.....
.....
.....
.....
.....

SIGNATURE OF INTERVIEWER

INVESTIGATION REQUESTED BY
Originating Official

DATE

September 11, 1946

II
REACTION OF UNITED STATES AMBASSADORS TO
THE TAKING OVER BY THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
GROUP OF INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN LATIN AMERICA

The United States Ambassadors in Latin America have expressed extreme apprehension in connection with the current plans to replace and supplant FBI intelligence operations in Latin America with the CIG organization. The Ambassadors have based their concern and opposition to this change on the fact that the FBI has securely established itself over a period of years in Latin America, is performing a good job, and any change will result in loss of efficiency and smoothness in operation due to the inexperience of the new organization. The oldest in point of service and most experienced Ambassadors, such as Ambassadors Walter Thurston in Mexico, Frank P. Corrigan in Venezuela, Claude G. Bowers in Chile, John C. Wiley in Colombia, and George S. Messersmith in Argentina, have been especially outspoken in their opposition to the change because of the above-stated reasons and have also stated that cessation of FBI operations would have a seriously detrimental effect on the work of each United States Embassy due to the loss of important information that is inevitable incidental to a new agency establishing itself in the intelligence field. These Ambassadors have stated that the Central Intelligence Group could not hope to attain the level of efficiency and productiveness accomplished by the FBI in less than several years, if ever.

EX-6
RECORDED

62-80750-206

Such Ambassadors as Joseph Flack of Bolivia, Robert M. Scotten of Ecuador, Willard L. Beaulac of Paraguay, William D. Pawley of Brazil, Wiley of Colombia, and Bowers of Chile expressed amazement and concern that such a radical change, which would gravely affect their work, should be made without consultation with the United States Ambassadors who, due to their experience in this field and their necessary reliance on such work, should have been consulted.

All of the Ambassadors have remarked upon the extreme importance of coordination by the United States intelligence agency with the Embassy and have pointed out that the FBI has cooperated most effectively in this regard. They all expressed opposition to any change because a new agency, they felt, would not be inclined to the same cooperation with the Ambassador and the Embassy generally. Several of the Ambassadors pointed out that they had originally opposed the FBI or any other organization entering into the foreign intelligence field, particularly by utilizing Embassy facilities,

53 OCT 14 1946

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SEP 11 1946
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SP2/PLA/mj

but that the outstanding success of the FBI in effecting close cooperation with the Embassy to the mutual benefit of all concerned had convinced them that the FBI was essential and was the only agency which could successfully operate in the foreign intelligence field to the satisfaction of all concerned.

A number of the Ambassadors expressed apprehension as to possible danger of embarrassment because of resentment of local governments concerning any change in connection with the intelligence interests of the United States Government. The Ambassadors pointed out that practically all of the Latin American countries have given some kind of clearance to the work that is now being performed and that no embarrassment has ever resulted during the several years of operation by the FBI. The Ambassadors, particularly Scotten in Ecuador, Edwin Kyle in Guatemala, R. Henry Norweb in Cuba, Thurston in Mexico, Corrigan in Venezuela, Pawley in Brazil, Bowers in Chile, and Beaulac in Paraguay, have expressed a high degree of satisfaction with the police liaison arrangements which have been openly arranged with Latin American authorities by the FBI. Such police liaison arrangements have been effected with a majority of the Latin American countries. The Ambassadors are particularly interested in the FBI maintaining this police liaison as a part of the general intelligence program of the United States Government due to the importance of counterintelligence which can be most effectively handled through such arrangements. The Ambassadors were concerned that the new Central Intelligence Agency would probably not be able to effect such arrangements or to operate in cooperation with the local governments and, therefore, must necessarily operate completely clandestine and under cover with the resultant loss of efficiency and productiveness and the constant hazard of embarrassment to the United States Government through discovery of their activities.

Ambassador Beaulac of Paraguay and Counselor Hugh Millard of the Chilean Embassy both vigorously opposed the change from the FBI to the CIG because of their experience with the Office of Strategic Services in the Iberian Peninsula during the war as contrasted to their experience with the FBI in Latin America. They felt that the new organization, that is the Central Intelligence Group, would operate similarly to the Office of Strategic Services with a resultant loss in efficiency and necessary embarrassing incidents, as well as having a non-cooperative attitude towards the Ambassador and the Embassy.

Ambassadors Norweb in Cuba, Messersmith in Argentina, Pawley in Brazil, and Bowers in Chile have expressed themselves as being particularly opposed to the new Central Intelligence Group because they feel this organization cannot help but be dominated by the United States Army. They pointed out that this would be most undesirable, particularly in Latin America where the type of intelligence desired and available is not along the lines of military secrets but along the lines of subversive activities, such as coverage of Communist and other groups which are potentially, if not actively, dangerous to the interests of the United States Government.

Tolson
E. A. Tamm
Clegg
Glavin
Ladd
Nichols
Rosen
Tracy
Carson
Egan
Gurnea
Harbo
Hendon
Pennington
Quinn Tamm
Nease
Miss Gandy

V.P. KEAY:mrl

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Director, FBI

August 9, 1946

I have been advised by Mr. Tamm of his discussion today with you relative to the letter addressed to you under date of August 8th and bearing the signatures of Messrs. Patterson, Acheson and Sullivan and Admiral Leahy, relative to the transfer of the intelligence functions performed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation in Latin America to the Central Intelligence Group. I am addressing to you separately today a memorandum outlining in detail the developments with reference to this situation since the Central Intelligence Authority obtained a Presidential directive establishing itself as an operating unit in the collection of intelligence information, and General Vandenberg, pursuant to that directive, indicated his desire to take over the coverage of Latin American intelligence. Mr. Tamm has advised me of your desire to agree to the tentative schedule for the transfer of intelligence functions to CIG in so far as it is practicable and possible, in view of your feeling that the President has undoubtedly approved the attached action recommended by Mr. Patterson and the co-signers representing the State and Navy Departments and the White House.

It is noted that this schedule proposes that the Central Intelligence Group will take over the coverage of designated Latin American countries on February 15, 1947, will take over a second group on April 1, 1947 and the balance of the Latin American countries on May 15, 1947. If you insist on my complying with this schedule, I will, of course, have no alternative but to agree to it. I desire to point out to you, however, that I had anticipated insisting with General Vandenberg that the Central Intelligence Group take over the first group of offices on September 15, 1946, a second group on November 1, 1946, and the balance of the Latin American offices on January 1, 1947. I contemplated this action ~~as being~~ first to return to the domestic service of the FBI as promptly as possible the experienced Bureau Agents who have been operating the intelligence service in South America. It is unnecessary for me to point out to you again the dire need which the Bureau has at this time for special Agents, and I feel that since the Central Intelligence Group desired to take over the Latin American coverage, the sooner the Bureau Agents returned to their domestic duties, the better off the Bureau will be.

Since my representatives in Latin America know of the contemplated program of General Vandenberg -- the State Department has already advised all of its Latin American Ambassadors of the proposed CIG program -- it is a matter of considerable difficulty to keep the interest of the Bureau personnel in Latin America at an efficient level.

EAT:DS

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 4-9-91 BY 6px/Amfmg

OCT 23 1946

Since these men know that their assignments as intelligence agents in South America will shortly terminate, they rapidly, as a matter of human nature, lose interest in a job which they consider is now finished and their interests naturally turn to their new assignments and responsibilities in the United States. I feel, consequently, that the quality of the Bureau's performance in Latin America will probably decline because of the diminishing interest on the part of Bureau Agents in these assignments. I think that in the interest of efficiency it is highly desirable to transfer these men to their new duties and the duties in which their interest will now lie as soon as possible. I think, conversely, it is highly desirable, since the CIC desires to go into the Latin American field, that they take over their responsibilities as soon as possible.

A third element which enters into a decision upon this subject is the fact that undoubtedly, and despite their assurances to the contrary, the Central Intelligence Group, will definitely endeavor to proselyte Bureau personnel presently serving upon intelligence assignments. The Bureau's representatives in the Latin American field are men of outstanding qualifications with exceptional backgrounds and they have performed very meritorious service in the Latin American Field. It is logical to assume that the Central Intelligence Group will endeavor to secure the services of these people. I feel that the sooner the Bureau brings these people back to the United States, the less danger there is of the Bureau's losing the services of experienced personnel, which is so vitally requires in the domestic field at the present time.

I do not believe that the General Vandenberg group can contend that they are unable to take over the Latin American intelligence duties until next year because of their inability to obtain personnel. Certainly when the Bureau was instructed to establish a Latin American intelligence service, no latitude was allowed for any extended period of personnel recruitment and the Bureau virtually overnight placed in the Latin American countries an operating, efficient intelligence service.

Memorandum for the Attorney General

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I feel, consequently, that the Central Intelligence Group should be required to take over the Latin American intelligence in three stages -- taking over the first group of offices in their proposed schedule on September 15, 1946, the second group on November 1, 1946, and the final group on January 1, 1947. While I, of course, will do whatever you desire in this situation, I do want you to know that I feel very strongly that the Central Intelligence Group, having sought the coverage of intelligence in the Latin American field, should be required to assume promptly the responsibility for this coverage.

I am returning herewith the original letter addressed to you by Messrs. Patterson, Acheson, Sullivan and Leahy and the attachment referred to therein.

Attachment

COPY:FC

OFFICE MEMORANDUM - UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: August 23, 1946

FROM : C. H. CARSON

SUBJECT: INTERVIEW WITH GEORGE S. MESSERSMITH
UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR TO ARGENTINA

Upon the occasion of my recent visit to Argentina, I interviewed the United States Ambassador, George S. Messersmith, on August 8, 1946. I explained to him very carefully the Bureau's position with regard to the current foreign intelligence situation and the fact that the Bureau is being supplanted in this work in Latin America by the Central Intelligence Group under General Vandenberg.

Mr. Messersmith was very cordial. He asked to be remembered to you and to Mr. Tamm. He stated that he has been previously advised of the CIG plan and that he definitely does not agree with the plan and is going to take appropriate steps to see that it is changed. He inquired as to the writer's opinion concerning the finality of the decision with regard to CIG operations in Latin America and I told him that so far as you and the Bureau is concerned it is final and that the Bureau is taking the necessary steps to withdraw and turn the work over to CIG. He was told that efforts are being made and negotiations are presently underway with CIG to effect an agreement of turning over the work to CIG on a mutually agreeable basis.

Mr. Messersmith expressed keen interest in the organizational setup and the plan of operations contemplated by CIG. I explained to him the Bureau's limited knowledge concerning this situation. He inquired as to whether it was "just another Army brass hat affair". I told him that I did not know although it was, of course, mentioned during our discussion that General Vandenberg was the former head of G-2 and that General Vandenberg does have a large percentage of Army officers assigned to the organization of the project. I told him that so far as I knew, the CIG purports to be a civilian agency. Mr. Messersmith voiced the very definite opinion that it is just another Army scheme and that while he would be opposed to any group taking over and changing the present setup as operated by the FBI, he definitely is not going to stand for any Army "brass hat" interference in intelligence matters in Argentina. He repeated a number of times, "I simply will not stand for it." He, of course, went into his usual discourse as to the amount of influence possessed by Messersmith in Washington and the fact that he will use such influence to get his decision changed. I explained to him very carefully that you had never solicited the SIS work and that you are entirely agreeable to quick and prompt compliance with the decision whereby CIG is to take over. I explained to him the extreme difficulty and delicacy of our position in handling any of the work in Latin America at present after we know absolutely we are withdrawing within a very short period of time, explaining that there will undoubtedly be loss of efficiency, etc. due to our complete inability to make the necessary plans, commitments, etc. for the continuance of the work.

I pointed out to Mr. Messersmith that the Bureau is not advised as to the methods, procedures, etc. that CIG might desire to use when they take over,

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53 OCT 16 1946

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Memorandum for the Director

although they have definitely indicated an intention of working in the American Embassy abroad. Mr. Messersmith remarked that he will not permit this group to operate in his Embassy in Argentina.

He was unusually warm in his praise of the work of the FBI, both in Mexico, where he formerly served, and in Argentina. He mentioned Special Agent Haber Clegg, who is presently handling our work in Argentina under the title of Special Assistant to the Ambassador, very favorably and was extremely high in his praise as to the manner in which the work is being handled. He remarked that upon the very day of the interview, he had just been advised by the Office of Mr. Clegg concerning the resignation of an important Argentine Government official and the real, behind the scenes, reason for such resignation. Mr. Messersmith was frankly amazed that this information had been obtained by our Office and reported to him prior to its being announced or prior to the information being available to any other Embassy source or official. He stated that the information was highly important to him inasmuch as the government official involved had in the past showed some signs of being hostile to Mr. Messersmith personally. He inquired as to whether the Bureau intended to leave Mr. Clegg and the other personnel presently assigned in Argentina there until the end of the fiscal year. I again attempted to explain to him that we are negotiating with CIG as to a mutually convenient date whereby CIG can take over the work, thus permitting the Bureau to completely withdraw its personnel from each and every office in Latin America. I explained to him that the Bureau, of course, because of the very unsound and illogical situation of us continuing for any appreciable length of time when we know that CIG is going to take over permanently, is attempting to reach an agreement with CIG for a very prompt date upon which they will take over the work in Argentina and permit us to withdraw.

Mr. Messersmith remarked with some asperity that neither CIG nor anyone else is going to take over any intelligence work in the Argentine Embassy "without my having something to say about it". I explained to him that so far as the Bureau knows, CIG is presumably negotiating with the State Department in Washington concerning their entering the Embassies and Consulates abroad to carry on the intelligence work. Mr. Messersmith again indicated that he did not contemplate the CIG or anyone else entering his Embassy in Argentina to carry on intelligence work for which reason he was very much concerned as to how long the FBI could continue to handle the work in Argentina. I explained to him that we were presently negotiating this point with CIG and the State Department, but that we were attempting to withdraw entirely at the earliest possible date. He agreed to the logic of the Bureau's position of withdrawing as soon as possible provided that we have to withdraw at all, and he finally said, "I would like for you to tell Mr. Hoover that I will personally appreciate his continuing the work here as long as he feels that he can". He also requested me to thank you personally for the way in which the new setup under Special Agent Haber Clegg was arranged in Argentina at the time of his advent as Ambassador. It will be recalled that the Bureau upon the suggestion of Messersmith changed our title

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Memorandum for the Director

and the key personnel in the Office who had become identified with the former Legal Attache's Office.

Mr. Messersmith then indicated that you and the Bureau had appreciated the difficulty of his position in entering Argentina under the circumstances of the peculiar situation there at the time of his advent apparently better than many officials of the State Department in Washington. He then proceeded to outline to me the fact that he had been requested personally by Mr. Truman, the President, and by Secretary of State Byrnes to come to Argentina as Ambassador in view of the very difficult and delicate situation existing because of the long-time animosity with the Peron regime and that fact that Peron had just been elected President of Argentina by a tremendous and decisive majority. He added that Mr. Braden, the Assistant Secretary of State, had jointed in this request and had enthusiastically endorsed Messersmith's position to the effect that he would be willing to undertake the assignment on the basis of his using his best judgment, etc., during the tenure of his ambassadorship in Argentina. He advised that Mr. Braden is not now supporting Messersmith or the latter's position in Argentina. He went on to state that Mr. Braden is circulating false and erroneous accusations to the effect that Messersmith has "sold-out" to the Peron regime and to pro-Peron interests, including pro-Peron American interests. After repeating a number of times a statement "I will not stand for this", he added his own opinion to the effect that Braden is jealous of the success which he anticipates that he, Messersmith, will have in working out things in Argentina in a beneficial and advantageous manner to the United States as contrasted with the complete lack of success enjoyed by Mr. Braden, the former Ambassador. He reiterated a number of denials that he has "sold-out" to anybody or that he has in any way yielded to pleasure, etc. He intimated that his policy and procedure in Argentina is different than the one pursued by Braden and expressed confidence that he will obtain desirable and satisfactory results. While Messersmith did not so state, it is obvious that he is working along the general line of effecting an agreement and "modus vivendi" with Peron and the Argentine Government. While there is no evidence whatsoever available to our office in Argentina that he has "sold-out" or anything of the kind, it is obvious that he is working toward an amicable basis of doing business with Argentina in the future. It is possible that Mr. Braden and certain of his supporters within the State Department do feel that any agreement or rapprochement with Peron's Government at all constitutes a betrayal of the original United States' position to the effect that Peron's Government is Fascist for which reason no friendly relationship should ever be reached with it. It is believed that Messersmith is shrewd enough to realize that the majority of American public opinion, the most influential sections of the American press and the American Congress favor some kind of an agreement whereby the United States can do business with Argentina.

He specifically requested that I keep this conversation entirely and completely confidential. I assure him, of course, that I would keep the discussion confidential, but stated that I did think that you should be advised for your background information. Mr. Messersmith agreed that you should be advised and suggested that this be done. This information was previously

Memorandum for the Director

furnished to the Bureau by radiogram. Special Agent Heber Clegg was, of course, advised for his own confidential information.

ACTION

It is believed that Messersmith is still Messersmith. It is difficult to say how sincere he is in his present protestations of friendship and admiration for the FBI. I think that he does appreciate the value of our work both in Mexico and also in Argentina. I think that he is also sincere in opposing the advent of the Central Intelligence Group. I think that he will continue to oppose this idea particularly in so far as any work they might do in Argentina or wherever he might be Ambassador.

CHC:FA

October 8, 1946

PERSONAL AND ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
BY SPECIAL MESSENGER

720
67
RECORDED 62-80750-214
HONORABLE George E. Allen
Director
Reconstruction Finance Corporation
Washington, D. C.

Dear George:

I thought that the following information might well be of interest to the President and to you.

SPR/Alm/mw
4/3/97

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With best wishes and kind regards,

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAILED A

OCT 9 - 1946 P.M.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

CT 17 1946

100-443886-100
Rosen
Tracy
Carson
Egan
Gurnea
Harbo
Hendon
Pennington
Quinn Tamm
Nease
as Andy

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - AIR POUCH

Date: October 9, 1946

To: Civil Attache
Mexico, D. F.

From: Director, FBI

Subject: Central Intelligence Group

RECORDED BY SP2/Alm/aw
EX-197

Reference is made to Bureau cablegram dated September 6, 1946, concerning a story in "Inter-American Magazine" setting forth that an under-cover operative of CIG had entered Guadalajara as a wine salesman.

You are instructed to immediately advise the Bureau concerning information obtained by you as to the incident referred to in reference cable.

VPK:mrl

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Coffey
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Carson
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Mr. Nease
Miss Gandy

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAILED 5
OCT 10 1946 P.M.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

55 OCT 17 1946

RECORDED

58

OCT 17 1946

62-80750-216

THE DIRECTOR

D. M. LADD

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-8-97 BY SP-1/AM/ma

OCTOBER 2, 1946

ARTICLE APPEARING IN LIFE MAGAZINE, SEPTEMBER 30, 1946,
ENTITLED "INTELLIGENCE KEY TO DEFENSE" BY WILLIAM J. DONOVAN

An article appeared in Life Magazine on September 30, 1946, entitled "Intelligence Key to Defense" by William J. Donovan. This article essentially attempts to establish that we had no successful intelligence of any kind prior to World War II; the establishment of the CIC-NIA setup completely fails to solve the problem since it perpetuates past defects; the OSS setup was highly successful through the war; and a new super-agency proposed by Donovan with an all-powerful Director completely controlling intelligence and with an independent budget is the only solution to the intelligence program.

The Article

Donovan starts his article by pointing out the necessity for accurate information in order that the United States may be protected against its enemies. He states: "Our hope for peace depends upon our foreign policy and to determine that policy we must test the facts which bear upon the economic, spiritual, and political factors involved. This being so, common sense dictates that we do two things. First, we must at all times know what is going on in the world. Second, we must never again— in General Marshall's phrase—slump so far in our 'military posture' as to encourage another nation in the belief the U.S. can be defeated in war." Donovan points out that Russia through the N.K.V.D. operates espionage on a mass basis and that British and French intelligence are built around a small number of highly trained specialists. He quotes from the Royal Commission report on the Canadian-Soviet espionage case and states that the prime object of the N.K.V.D. in Canada was to steal the formula for the atomic bomb, as well as other secrets. He concludes, "It is a fair assumption that whatever the N.K.V.D. did or is doing in Canada was done and is being done here." The article states that the United States no longer has the protection of the oceans, and a substitute defense must be developed. One method of defense would be a huge military establishment, which would be ruinous to the country, but the alternative which is cheaper and "more congenial to our institutions" is intelligence.

Donovan states that an intelligence service "with a skilled and trained group of scholars and experts" could be of the greatest assistance in reaching the right decisions at the right time. He then states that we do not have such an intelligence service now. He points out that we do have a new organization called the National Intelligence Authority which is supposed to take the place of OSS, "But it is my (Donovan's) considered opinion that the new agency, though outwardly different from the mechanism in use before the war, perpetuates some of its worse defects and is no safeguard at all."

The article states, "There were not even the glimmerings of a counter-espionage system to check on the foreign agents seeking entrance to our country"

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47 10/22/46

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Carson
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Mr. Nease
Miss Gandy

18 1946

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

Memorandum for the Director

prior to World War II and we had only the conventional intelligence service of the Departments of State, War, and Navy. Not only did we lack any intelligence organization, but, according to Donovan, what intelligence we received was not put to proper use. Donovan then describes how he watched the German 88-mm. gun operate in the Spanish War, which he reported to General Malin Craig, then Chief of Staff of the United States, but this information was never given to General Marshall and we were completely surprised in World War II by the performance of the German 88-mm. gun. It is stated that in 1941, scattered through the various government departments were documents, memoranda, and reports which, if properly brought together, would have given the United States leaders the needed insight and knowledge concerning the potentials of the Axis powers. Predicated upon such a state of disorganization, the task of organizing OSS was begun and Donovan concluded that it made no sense to try to coordinate the various intelligence agencies already existing, but that it would be necessary to set up a new, independent agency.

The article then describes the OSS organization briefly, pointing out that information was gathered and research specialists trained in various scientific fields interpreted it. The strategic information thus obtained was the raw material upon which the President and his military and political advisors formed their operational decisions. He states, "The heart of American wartime intelligence was a collection of highly implausible 'operators'--scholars and research men, economists, engineers, experts on European labor movements, historians, linguists, anthropologists and sociologists learned in the lore of strategic regions." Two instances were set forth showing the application of this strategic intelligence, one relating to predictions that the German food position would force her early collapse, which prediction was disagreed with by the OSS experts, and the other a prediction that German combat manpower would be most unlikely to limit German capabilities, with which the OSS experts were also in disagreement. In both instances it turned out that the OSS experts were correct. There follows a description of numerous wartime exploits of OSS operators involving dropping by parachute in enemy territory, setting up of a clandestine radio network in Germany, etc., which illustrations of course apply entirely to wartime intelligence.

Donovan concludes his article by pointing out that a year ago the OSS organization was broken up and replaced by the Central Intelligence Group, and he describes briefly the setup of the National Intelligence Authority and the Central Intelligence Group. He states, "There has emerged a makeshift intelligence service, honoring in the breach every principle learned so painfully under fire." He then sets out the precepts upon which an American intelligence agency should be based, which are as follows:

- (1) Independence--Independence of all departments of the government, but not restricting the activities of G-2, Naval Intelligence and the State Department, which should assemble information for their own needs.
- (2) Direction--An advisory board of the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy.

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
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Mr. Harbo
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Mr. Nease
Miss Gandy

Memorandum for the Director

(3) Coordination and Analysis of Information--Collection of information from all other agencies and evaluating and interpreting it in the form of strategic studies.

(4) Personnel--Staff of specialists with linguistic competence and regional knowledge, using active or retired officers in the diplomatic, military, and naval circles who are qualified. It is pointed out that foreign-born experts should be used, but that the present intelligence setup shies away from these people in error.

(5) Wartime Operations--Central agency must have sole authority as to the conduct of morale, psychological, counterespionage and special operations in enemy or enemy-occupied territory.

(6) Administration--A civilian director appointed by the President and an independent congressional budget.

(7) Limitation--separation of law enforcement and intelligence. Donovan states the agency must not be allowed to become a Gestapo and it should be limited by law to gathering intelligence information abroad.

(8) Security--Its own system of codes and facilities for communication.

(9) Wartime control--During war or unlimited emergencies the agency should be coordinated with various military forces under the immediate command of the joint chiefs of staff.

The final point made in the article is that the agreement between President Roosevelt and Stalin regarding Russia's entry into the Pacific War was based on information that the Japanese had 750,000 troops in Manchuria. This estimate was entirely wrong (a failure of intelligence) and, therefore, Mr. Roosevelt bid too high for Russian help. The reason the intelligence information was wrong was that by agreement with Chiang Kai-shek (according to Donovan), we did not have a single American agent in China. It is stated, "The consequences of Yalta will remain with us. To avoid such blunders in the future, our only hope is the kind of intelligence service we built at so heavy a cost--and junked." (OSS?)

Comment

The precepts laid down by Donovan for the establishment of a U. S. intelligence service are essentially the same as the plan he previously prepared for President Roosevelt, that is a separate, independent agency, all powerful in the intelligence field, with an independent budget and Director reporting directly to the President. The weaknesses, of course, are evident, that is the creation of an agency to do the work of the OSS in accordance with Donovan's concept would involve a colossal, expensive super-structure which, by its sheer size, could not preserve the necessary secrecy; it

Mr. Tolson _____
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Mr. Pennington _____
Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
Mr. Nease _____
Miss Gandy _____

Memorandum for the Director

would be in conflict with the regular agencies of the government in their statutory duties; and it would create a grave hazard as one agency would be entrusted with the collection, evaluation, and dissemination of all intelligence, subject to unavoidable bias and coloration. The latter is particularly important in view of the type of people Donovan proposes to employ, especially "foreign-born experts."

It will be recalled that the joint chiefs of staff submitted a plan for a central intelligence agency at the time Donovan presented his plan to President Roosevelt in which they proposed a very similar structure to that proposed by Donovan except that a board composed of the Secretaries of State, War and Navy and the Chief of Staff to the President was to be responsible for the overall intelligence organization. This board was to create the central intelligence agency which was to be headed by a Director appointed by the President and recommended by the Board, but the central intelligence agency would actually be controlled by the board. Under Donovan's plan, of course, the Director of the central intelligence agency would be all-powerful and he would be merely advised by the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy. The net result of both the JIC plan and the Donovan plan would be the same, that is a colossal, superstructure, all powerful, involving a huge setup with heavy expense, together with considerable duplication and conflict with the work of other governmental agencies.

The new Central Intelligence Group as set up by President Truman resembles, of course, both the old Donovan and the JIC plans inasmuch as they were both essentially the same, but it carries the concept of the JIC plan in that the National Intelligence Authority is a top governing authority rather than the Director of the CIG. It does not have the independent budget proposed by Donovan, but Vandenberg is trying to get it. The original directive of President Truman, of course, originally set up the CIG-NIA as a solely coordinating group, but the directive of the NIA setting up the Central Intelligence Group as a world-wide field operational agency essentially constitutes the new setup as Donovan and the joint chiefs of staff originally conceived it.

Donovan's article, when carefully read, reveals his concepts of intelligence are based chiefly on wartime operations and certainly the examples he uses of the successful OSS operations are solely wartime military exploits, such as operations behind the enemies' lines instituted by the use of parachutes, etc.

The Bureau is not mentioned in the article. There are a couple of statements, however, that could apply to the Bureau. Donovan stated that before the war there was no intelligence agency which was responsible for protecting the security of the United States by checking on foreign agents seeking entrance into our country. He also stated that what the Russians did in Canada was done and is being done here. In his precepts for a successful intelligence agency, he is careful to point out that law enforcement and intelligence should be entirely separate, obviously referring to the Bureau.

Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Carson
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Mr. Nease
Miss Gandy

September 19, 1946

~~PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~BY SPECIAL MESSENGER~~

Honorable William D. Pawley
United States Ambassador to Brazil
Department of State
Washington, D. C.

DECLASSIFIED BY SP2/AN/mj
ON 4/8/91

My dear Mr. Ambassador:

I wish to acknowledge receipt of your letter dated August 29, 1946, in which you refer to a conversation with Mr. C. H. Carson of this Bureau concerning the contemplated early withdrawal of FBI representatives from Latin America and the taking over of the work by Central Intelligence Group representatives under the direction of General Vandenberg. Mr. Carson had previously advised me with regard to his conversation with you.

As you are aware, this Bureau is presently negotiating with the appropriate officials of the Central Intelligence Group, including General Vandenberg, and with the State Department concerning the necessary details as to the withdrawal of FBI representatives and the supplanting and replacing of same with CIG representatives in order that there will be a minimum amount of loss in intelligence coverage. I am sure that you realize that it is distinctly the decision and the desire of the appropriate officials of the United States Government that this Bureau discontinue its work in Latin America and withdraw from this field. The decision to withdraw from the work in Latin America was definitely not the decision of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, although, as you are also aware, the Federal Bureau of Investigation did not seek the responsibility for this work when it was initially undertaken. The Federal Bureau of Investigation initiated its program of intelligence coverage in Latin America upon the specific instructions of the late President Roosevelt. It is my understanding that it is the desire of the Cabinet members comprising the National Intelligence Authority and the members of the Central Intelligence Group to replace the Federal Bureau of Investigation in Latin America with an organization to be established and controlled by the Central Intelligence Group in order to insure greater efficiency and better coverage, which the sponsors of this organization feel they will be able to

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EAT:DS

Communications Section
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achieve. The transfer of the responsibilities for Latin American coverage from the FBI to CIG has, I am informed, the approval of President Truman.

I agree with you wholeheartedly, of course, with regard to the importance of the work and its tremendous value to the United States Government at this time. As indicated above, however, I am forced to conclude that the officials of the NIA and the CIG are of the opinion that greater efficiency can be obtained by our withdrawal and by utilizing a new organization under the direct control of CIG, which position, I am advised, is supported by the President. I am not fully advised as to the plans of the CIG with regard to future personnel. However, as you doubtless realize, the Federal Bureau of Investigation has a very great and pressing need for all of its personnel, including that presently serving abroad, within the United States at the present time. Our responsibilities and work in the domestic field have increased in some very important respects, including certain phases of intelligence work, since the end of hostilities in Europe and Asia, for which reason we are in somewhat desperate need of all the experienced personnel available. The Bureau is shortly to be assigned the responsibility for all investigative work relating to the atomic power and atomic bomb project, which responsibility will necessitate the handling of many thousands of new investigations. The personnel presently being used by the Bureau in the Latin American field was originally trained for performance of the Bureau's domestic work. When former President Roosevelt assigned the Latin American project to the Bureau, these men were given special training for their foreign assignments, but as I have indicated, their basic training was to perform the domestic responsibilities of the Bureau. These men were trained at the cost of the FBI for the purpose of doing the FBI's work and I believe, in the light of the additional responsibilities assigned to the Bureau in the United States, I am entirely justified in taking a very firm position that I will not agree to the transferring of Bureau personnel to the new CIG group when I know that such a transfer will result in a serious curtailment of the Bureau's work in the domestic field. I definitely cannot agree that Bureau personnel is more urgently needed with regard to matters of more vital importance to the United States Government and its security by any other agency than the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Honorable William D. Pawley

-3-

I do want to thank you for your commendatory remarks with regard to our past efforts in Latin America, and I want you to realize that this Bureau will remain anxious to cooperate with you to the fullest extent in matters of mutual interest in the future.

With expressions of my highest esteem and best regards.

Sincerely,

J. Edgar Hoover

EAT:DS 9-25-46

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

Note the attached request from CIG for copies of our quarterly intelligence summaries from 1942 to 1944 and for a copy of the "brief" prepared in the Harry Bridges case. Mr. Ladd and I are of the opinion that in so far as the quarterly intelligence summary is concerned, we should advise CIG that we do not have any additional copies of this document since only sufficient copies were printed for the mailing list at that time. It seems that CIG should be able to get these reports from the Military or Naval AUTHORITIES.

Since there apparently was a printed document prepared in the Harry Bridges case, we see no objection to either furnishing a copy of it to CIG, or if we don't have a copy, telling them where they can get it.

Respectfully,

Director's notation: "I agree. H."

Edw. A. Tamm

EAT:DS

CC - Mr. Ladd

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HANDLED BY
MR. Tamm

EX-28

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49 OCT 28 1946

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EX-28

INITIALS ON ORIGINAL

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~~PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL~~
BY SPECIAL MESSENGER

DATE: October 4, 1946

To: Lieutenant General Hoyt S. Vandenberg
Director
Central Intelligence Group
Room 2166, New War Department Building
21st and Virginia Avenue, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

b3

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

Reference is made to your communication of September 23, 1946, addressed to Mr. E. A. Tamm.

Please be advised that the Quarterly Intelligence Summary referred to by you in your communication was published from November, 1940, until August, 1945. I regret that there are no extra copies of these summaries available since at the time they were printed only sufficient copies were made in order to take care of the current mailing list. Inasmuch as copies of these summaries were made available to G-2, as well as to OMI, it is suggested that you contact one of these two agencies which may have copies which can be made available to you.

With reference to your further request that you be supplied with a copy of the brief prepared in the Harry Bridges matter, there is attached hereto a copy of this brief which you may retain for your files.

Enclosure

JEM:mod

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
OCT 5, 1946DECLASSIFIED BY SP2/AM/...
ON 4/4/97

58 OCT 31 1946

FROM

DO

OFFICE OF DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

TO
OFFICIAL INDICATED BELOW BY CHECK MARK

Mr. Tolson _____
 Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
 Mr. Clegg _____
 Mr. Glavin _____
 Mr. Ladd _____
 Mr. Nichols _____
 Mr. Rosen _____
 Mr. Tracy _____
 Mr. Carson _____
 Mr. Gurnea _____
 Mr. Harbo _____
 Mr. Hendon _____
 Mr. Nease _____
 Miss Gandy _____

See Me _____
 Note and Return _____
 For Your Recommendation _____
 What are the facts? _____

Remarks:

*can be no back - fire
 Give this special & urgent
 attention.*

11. ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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 DATE *4/12/97* BY *5041/ma*

62-80750-224

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

8/29

1946

☒ The Director	Records Section
☐ Mr. Tolson	Personnel Files
☐ Mr. Ladd	Send File
☐ Mr. Rosen	Bring file up-
☐ Mr. Clegg	to-date
☐ Mr. Glavin	Search, serial-
☐ Mr. Nichols	Mr. Tolson-----ize, and route
☐ Mr. Tracy	Mr. E. A. Tamm-----Reading Room
☐ Mr. Harbo	Mr. Clegg-----Mechanical Section
☐ Mr. Hendon	Mr. Glavin-----Bureau Supply Section
☐ Mr. Pennington	Mr. Ladd-----Mail Room
☐ Mr. Quinn Tamm	Mr. Nichols-----
☐ Mr. Nease	Mr. Rosen-----
☐ Mr. Coyne	Mr. Tracy-----
☐ Miss Gandy	Mr. Carson-----
☐ Mr. Carson	Mr. Egan-----Call me re this
	Mr. Gurnea-----Note and return
	Mr. Harbo-----
	Mr. Hendon-----File
	Mr. Pennington-----
☐ Miss Stalcup	Mr. Quinn Tamm-----Stamp and mail
☐ Miss Gray	Mr. Nease-----Prepare tickler
☐ Miss Butcher	Miss Gandy-----Call these files

See Me

*I thought you would want to look
this over before mailing.*

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DATE 4-10-97 BY SP-10/10/97

Edward A. Tamm

5734

September 11, 1946

REACTION OF UNITED STATES AMBASSADORS TO
THE TAKING OVER BY THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
GROUP OF INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN LATIN AMERICA

The United States Ambassadors in Latin America have expressed extreme apprehension in connection with the current plans to replace and supplant FBI intelligence operations in Latin America with the CIG organization. The Ambassadors have based their concern and opposition to this change on the fact that the FBI has securely established itself over a period of years in Latin America, is performing a good job, and any change will result in loss of efficiency and smoothness in operation due to the inexperience of the new organization. The oldest in point of service and most experienced Ambassadors, such as Ambassadors Walter Thurston in Mexico, Frank P. Corrigan in Venezuela, Claude G. Bowers in Chile, John C. Wiley in Colombia, and George S. Messersmith in Argentina, have been especially outspoken in their opposition to the change because of the above-stated reasons and have also stated that cessation of FBI operations would have a seriously detrimental effect on the work of each United States Embassy due to the loss of important information that is inevitable incidental to a new agency establishing itself in the intelligence field. These Ambassadors have stated that the Central Intelligence Group could not hope to attain the level of efficiency and productiveness accomplished by the FBI in less than several years, if ever.

Such Ambassadors as Joseph Flack of Bolivia, Robert M. Scotten of Ecuador, Willard L. Beaulac of Paraguay, William D. Pawley of Brazil, Wiley of Colombia, and Bowers of Chile expressed amazement and concern that such a radical change, which would gravely affect their work, should be made without consultation with the United States Ambassadors who, due to their experience in this field and their necessary reliance on such work, should have been consulted.

All of the Ambassadors have remarked upon the extreme importance of coordination by the United States intelligence agency with the Embassy and have pointed out that the FBI has cooperated most effectively in this regard. They all expressed opposition to any change because a new agency, they felt, would not be inclined to the same cooperation with the Ambassador and the Embassy generally. Several of the Ambassadors pointed out that they had originally opposed the FBI or any other organization entering into the foreign intelligence field, particularly by utilizing Embassy facilities,

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ENCLOSURE

but that the outstanding success of the FBI in effecting close cooperation with the Embassy to the mutual benefit of all concerned had convinced them that the FBI was essential and was the only agency which could successfully operate in the foreign intelligence field to the satisfaction of all concerned.

A number of the Ambassadors expressed apprehension as to possible danger of embarrassment because of resentment of local governments concerning any change in connection with the intelligence interests of the United States Government. The Ambassadors pointed out that practically all of the Latin American countries have given some kind of clearance to the work that is now being performed and that no embarrassment has ever resulted during the several years of operation by the FBI. The Ambassadors, particularly Scotten in Ecuador, Edwin Kyle in Guatemala, R. Henry Norweb in Cuba, Thurston in Mexico, Corrigan in Venezuela, Pawley in Brazil, Bowers in Chile, and Beaulac in Paraguay, have expressed a high degree of satisfaction with the police liaison arrangements which have been openly arranged with Latin American authorities by the FBI. Such police liaison arrangements have been effected with a majority of the Latin American countries. The Ambassadors are particularly interested in the FBI maintaining this police liaison as a part of the general intelligence program of the United States Government due to the importance of counterintelligence which can be most effectively handled through such arrangements. The Ambassadors were concerned that the new Central Intelligence Agency would probably not be able to effect such arrangements or to operate in cooperation with the local governments and, therefore, must necessarily operate completely clandestine and under cover with the resultant loss of efficiency and productiveness and the constant hazard of embarrassment to the United States Government through discovery of their activities.

Ambassador Beaulac of Paraguay and Counselor Hugh Millard of the Chilean Embassy both vigorously opposed the change from the FBI to the CIG because of their experience with the Office of Strategic Services in the Iberian Peninsula during the war as contrasted to their experience with the FBI in Latin America. They felt that the new organization, that is the Central Intelligence Group, would operate similarly to the Office of Strategic Services with a resultant loss in efficiency and necessary embarrassing incidents, as well as having a non-cooperative attitude towards the Ambassador and the Embassy.

Ambassadors Norweb in Cuba, Messersmith in Argentina, Pawley in Brazil, and Bowers in Chile have expressed themselves as being particularly opposed to the new Central Intelligence Group because they feel this organization cannot help but be dominated by the United States Army. They pointed out that this would be most undesirable, particularly in Latin America where the type of intelligence desired and available is not along the lines of military secrets but along the lines of subversive activities, such as coverage of Communist and other groups which are potentially, if not actively, dangerous to the interests of the United States Government.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO THE DIRECTOR

FROM D. M. Ladd

SUBJECT: Reaction of United States Ambassadors to the Taking Over By the Central Intelligence Group of Intelligence Coverage in Latin America

DATE: September 10, 1946

Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Coffey
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Carson
Mr. Egan
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease
Miss Beahm
Miss Gandy

Attached is a blind memorandum summarizing the concern expressed by United States Ambassadors in Latin America and their expressed opposition to the current plans to replace and supplant the Bureau intelligence operations in Latin America with the CIG organization.

Attachment

VPK:mrl

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OCT 29 1946

59 NOV 12 1946

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. D. M. LADD

FROM : J. C. STRICKLAND

SUBJECT: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

DATE: October 9, 1946

~~SECRET~~

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Carson
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease
Miss Beahm
Miss Gandy

b3

ASAC Belmont of the New York Office called and advised that the Bureau by letter dated September 26, 1946, requested the New York Office to [redacted]

Mr. Belmont was instructed to send a teletype to the Bureau setting forth [redacted]

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DECLASSIFY ON: 25X

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10/13/46
OCT 29 1946

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asac Belmont instructed
to run down & confirm
OK

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WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

53 NOV 12 1946

~~SECRET~~

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. LADD *LS*

DATE:

FROM : E. G. FITCH *EF*

October 18, 1946

SUBJECT: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

Mr. Tolson _____
 Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
 Mr. Clegg _____
 Mr. Coffey _____
 Mr. Glavin _____
 Mr. Ladd _____
 Mr. Nichols _____
 Mr. Rosen _____
 Mr. Tracy _____
 Mr. Carson _____
 Mr. Egan _____
 Mr. Gurnea _____
 Mr. Hendon _____
 Mr. Pennington _____
 Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Mr. Nease _____
 Miss Beahm _____
 Miss Gandy _____

Reference is made to the memorandum dated October 9, 1946,
 to you from Mr. Strickland, wherein [REDACTED]

Inquiry in this matter was made [REDACTED]

b3

EXG:mk

EX-24
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 &
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 376

1162 sent 80-750-228
Letter with of 10/29/46
per Belmore 10/23/46
Received

Lt. Col. Par de Silva

59 NOV 8- 1946

Col. L. L. L.
NKE

OFFICE OF DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

TO
OFFICIAL INDICATED BELOW BY CHECK MARK

Mr. Tolson _____ ()
Mr. E. A. Tamm _____ ()
Mr. Clegg _____ ()
Mr. Glavin _____ ()
Mr. Ladd _____ ()
Mr. Nichols _____ ()
Mr. Rosen _____ ()
Mr. Tracy _____ ()
Mr. Carson _____ ()
Mr. Gurnea _____ ()
Mr. Harbo _____ ()
Mr. Hendon _____ ()
Mr. Nease _____ ()
Miss Gandy _____ ()

See Me _____ ()
Note and Return _____ ()
For Your Recommendation _____ ()
What are the facts? _____ ()

Remarks:

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Mr. Tolson _____
 Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
 Mr. Clegg _____
 Mr. Glavin _____
 Mr. Ladd _____
 Mr. Nichols _____
 Mr. Rosen _____
 Mr. Tracy _____
 Mr. Carson _____
 Mr. Egan _____
 Mr. Gurnea _____
 Mr. Harbo _____
 Mr. Hendon _____
 Mr. Pennington _____
 Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
 Mr. Nease _____
 Miss Gandy _____

True from


October 5, 1946.

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

You will recall that I previously advised

you that



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 ① Can't find original among

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RECORDED & INDEXED

37 Respectfully,
 EX-33

G. A. Nease 36 FEB 21 1947

Miss M. G. Nease
10/14/46

*I think we either ought
 to handle all investigations (performed)
 for C & G or none.*

57 MAR 7 - 1947